The CDS’ possible elevation is almost certain to precipitate hostile consequences for the MoD’s civilian hierarchy.
An incipient debate is underway in defence and security circles on further streamlining the stature and responsibilities of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS was first appointed five years ago to construct jointness and integration amongst the armed forces.
One of these deliberations centres on whether the CDS should be accorded the rank of a five-star officer to elevate his authority and reinforce his role at the apex of India’s military hierarchy. The current CDS, General Anil Chauhan, and Gen Bipin Rawat before him were four-star appointees — like the three service chiefs. Proposals to upgrade the rank are aimed at enhancing its operational clout and aligning its standing with international practices.
India has traditionally reserved five-star ranks for those who have rendered extraordinary military service, like Field Marshals Sam Manekshaw and KM Cariappa and Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh. Consequently, a cross-section of service veterans argues that bestowing such an elevated status upon a CDS might just end up ‘diluting’ its exclusivity during peacetime. But the possibility of such an event transpiring anyhow augurs a mix of opportunities, challenges and many implications for the armed forces and civil-military ties.
The CDS’ position came into being nearly two decades after the Kargil Review Committee recommendations, which emphasised the need for a single-point military adviser to the government and to forge military ‘jointness’. The CDS also doubles as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in addition to heading the Department of Military Affairs, established under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Additionally, he executes numerous other tasks, like force modernisation and prioritising materiel purchases.
However, despite these myriad responsibilities, the CDS is equal in rank to the service chiefs, albeit deemed the first among equals. Many insiders believe that this creates internal and, at times, antagonistic ambiguities in his authority.
Hence, elevating him to a five-star rank could provide the CDS overarching clout to enforce decisions across the services and augment his capacity to ensure smoother execution of joint operations and reforms, particularly in the ongoing endeavour of establishing Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs). The inference is that as a five-star officer, he could mitigate inter-service rivalries and be an effective interlocutor between the armed forces and political leadership, ensuring that military advice featured adequately in governmental strategic decisions.
But such an elevation is not without complications and the potential of disrupting delicate service hierarches, which are still in the process of familiarising themselves with a CDS. Perforce, it would generate further trepidation among the three service chiefs. They would perceive it as a further diminishment of their long-established autonomy, which, in any event, was likely to be notably reduced merely to recruiting and training of manpower and providing logistic support under the proposed ITC model, at present under governmental review.
Consequently, many veterans, fearful of a rupture in inter-service cooperation, maintain that the challenge in this regard lies in ensuring that a higher ranked CDS does not morph into ‘over-centralisation’ of power, thereby endangering collaborative decision-making. Many argue that this needs political oversight and sagacity on the part of both the government and Opposition, which though presently non-existent, could emerge in the future with tactful management.
Critics of creating a five-star CDS argue that such an elevated rank would largely be symbolic and in no way enhance his operational effectiveness. This, in any case, would be managed by ITC heads, who, too, are expected to be four-star officers. The naysayers also contend that the CDS’ ability to institute reforms and foster integration depends less on his stars and more on institutional support, consensus-building, resource allocation and political will. And, though a five-star designation would add lustre to the post, it could also detract focus from the substantive challenges of swift modernisation that confronts India’s military.
Moreover, a five-star rank would necessitate protocol changes, additional staff and resources, potentially diverting funds from other critical areas at a juncture when defence budgets are at an all-time low and beset with bitter competing priorities. Addressing entrenched systemic challenges, including bureaucratic hurdles, are other obstacles in the CDS’ rank upgrade that would necessitate deft navigation.
Apart from its multiple complex implications within the services, the CDS’ possible elevation is almost certain to precipitate hostile consequences for the MoD’s civilian hierarchy. For, a five-star CDS would indisputably ‘downgrade’ not only the Defence Secretary’s authority but also that of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and render uncertain the functioning of establishments like the Indian Coast Guard and possibly even the Border Roads Organisation, amongst others. In short, elevating the CDS could trigger a dire pushback from the civilian establishment, potentially complicating decision-making and further perpetuating unaffordable delays.
Countries like the US and UK have adopted diverse approaches to structuring their higher military leadership, exercising significant influence over their respective national security policies. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions as the highest-ranking four-star officer, advising the President and Secretary of Defence, but without possessing operational command, while the UK’s four-star CDS is tasked with overseeing strategic defence issues.
India could draw lessons from these models, focussing on empowering the CDS through institutional mechanisms rather than pursuing a feudal approach and opting for rank elevation. For, there is little doubt that while five-stars would symbolically, but fleetingly, enhance the CDS’ stature, it was not a panacea for the enduring tribulations of nurturing force ‘jointness’ and modernisation.
Instead, the focus needs to remain on aligning military reforms with the objectives outlined in a codified and, as yet, un-enunciated National Security Strategy. All decisions on the CDS’ possible rank elevation must weigh its strategic benefits against potential risks to ensure that it gainfully serves the long-term interests of India’s defence architecture.