Brig Vivek Lall

The notion of victory or military success, be it in war or counterterrorist operations, lies in the mind. We know it better now, because of the pervasiveness of social media and the ease in availability of information. For me, this lesson was driven home in the forests of Jammu and Kashmir on the LoC at a time when terrorism was at its peak in the early 1990s.

My battalion had just moved to the LoC in an area known to be a traditional infiltration route. Our warm welcome started with discovery of an improvised explosive device along the fence where we kept our ammunition. If that was not enough, we found solar-activated rockets apparently aimed at where some of the officers stayed. We were fortunate in preventing what could have been a very sticky beginning. In the period that followed, we did everything we could to ‘dominate’ the LoC and the entire area behind it, where there were about 20-odd villages spread over approximately 80-100 sq km. In the rear areas, our innovative patrols would climb mountains from one side and walk through villages on the other to completely surprise even the locals; and we cultivated a network to identify ‘over ground workers’ or terrorists operating in full view. One such person (a shopkeeper) had faced multiple arrests and interrogations by different agencies. In absence of evidence, he was always released.

Knowing that he would never volunteer information, we designed a simple yet innovative plan. I started calling him every morning to our headquarters, where he would be made to sit comfortably in full view of everyone moving around, including the porters. Each day we would ask him about his terrorist links, and each day he would deny it. After a couple of hours, we would send him back to his village, which was a 30-minute walk away. While returning, he would often stop for tea at a shop before starting his journey along a single road connecting to the highway. This road was mostly deserted with a few villages located at intervals. The routine continued without a break for almost a month. One such day, just before leaving him I sent some vehicles ahead. They parked along a lonely patch, pretending that one of the vehicles had broken down. Our suspect, as usual, stopped to have tea before starting his journey, all alone. When he came up to the vehicles, he was very quietly bundled into them and taken to our base, completely under cover and hidden.

By evening, village elders were seeking our support to find him. They appeared to accept that he probably had links with terrorists and run away to avoid being caught. Around midnight, our vehicles came up and in complete darkness brought our suspect to me.

Our psychological domination over this terrorist was complete. Realising his predicament, he gave away every bit of information he had. He then took our patrol to the forest near his village and showed where he had hidden his supply of weapons and ammunition. I ensured that the patrol returned through his village first thing in the morning with him in tow, and the captured weapons in full view of the villagers. For us, the biggest revelation was the first anti-personnel non-detectable mine in the cache he handed over. Had he used the mines; this could have been a different story. It took us 24 hours to pack him off into jail, but interestingly, he was out in just a few months. This time though, his demeanour had changed. There was no defiance left in his eyes, or any fear either — just acceptance.

The lesson for me lay more in how he was captured and what happened thereafter. We did not just dominate this terrorist’s mind space completely, but even of the villagers. One of the elders came up to me and said “sahab, aapka pir to hamare pir se bahut bara hai” (the saint that looks over you is bigger than ours).There were absolutely no incidents of terrorist activity in our rear areas thereafter. I don’t think that it was fear of the Army that did the trick. It was more akin to respect and recognition. And this was not just because of our patrols, but also because of our genuine efforts to support development in the area, including our Santa Claus like Commanding Officer who would go around distributing toffees to children each time he stepped out.

This was just one block in the district of Baramulla where our efforts found resonance. But it holds lessons for the entire state, that to counter terrorism and radicalisation, it is the mind-space that has to be dominated. Respect for state institutions can’t be achieved by force, nor can it be done by seeking popularity and going easy on offenders, and it certainly can’t be done by throwing development money. There are probably no fixed answers, just a muddled way ahead.

Amritsar: Lt Gen Rajeev Chopra, Director General, National Cadet Corps (NCC), visited the District NCC Group Headquarters here on Tuesday. He was received by Maj Gen RS Mann, ADG, NCC Directorate, PHHP, and Chandigarh, along with Brig RK Mour, Commander, NCC group, Amritsar. NCC cadets presented a guard of honour. Brig Mour breifed Lt Gen Chopra on the activities of the NCC units. Lt Gen Chopra said the NCC continued to contribute to society and nation building. TNS

Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, March 23

Vice Admiral Karambir Singh has been appointed the next Navy chief. He will replace Admiral Sunil Lanba who retires on May 31.

The Ministry of Defence announced the appointment on Saturday afternoon. Vice Admiral Karambir Singh, who hails from Jalandhar, supersedes Vice Admiral Bimal Verma, the Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the senior-most after Admiral Lanba.

Service chiefs are normally appointed two months in advance. Admiral RK Dhowan had been appointed chief after the 2014 general election was announced.  Ironically, he had also superseded Vice Admiral Sekhar Sinha.

The BJP government did not go by seniority when it appointed General Bipin Rawat as the Army chief, overlooking Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi.

Vice Admiral Karambir Singh is currently Commander of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakapatnam. 

Commissioned into the Navy in 1980, Vice Admiral Karambir is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy. He earned his wings as a helicopter pilot in 1982 and has flown extensively on the Chetak and Kamov helicopters.

He has been the Chief of Staff of the Tri-Services Unified Command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands and as the Flag Officer Commanding, Maharashtra and Gujarat Naval Area.

India has split into two parallel worlds, one of hysterical nationalism and the other of everyday politics that the Opposition is desperately asking the nation to return to. Yet, everyday politics is dismal, while nationalism especially fought like a video game is entrancing.

Shiv Visvanathan
Academic Associated with compost heap

THERE is something eerie about the events of the past week or so. Replaying the developments, one senses that one is watching a composite of two plays, radically different, but blending into each other. The action seems scripted, the plots worked out. The first script seemed like a conspiracy of nationalisms, combining paranoia and hypocrisy. At one level, the nationalism on each side allows for the free play of the unconscious. The aerial tussle was like a video game that Pakistan and India were playing, each striking down the other jubilantly. Each nation claimed victory. India violated Pakistan’s airspace and came back intact, convincing the world that it would attack Pakistan, if necessary. Pakistan highlighted its ability to play the surrogate game of terror and get the Islamic States to highlight ‘Indian barbarism’ in Kashmir.

Two paranoid displays of nationalism ended quickly, each side content with its imaginary and imagined gains. India exerted its masculine self, creating seamless politics between the elections and militarism. In view of the terror strike, PM Narendra Modi could attack the Opposition as a ‘fifth column’. It almost felt as if these encounters enabled two nationalisms to consolidate themselves, create a sense of achievement around the anxieties each nation projected onto the other. The Indian ritual was clear. It was as if mobilising India for war with a sleight of hand became a drama of the nation being mobilised for the elections.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, too, seems content with his performance, acting as if he is not a creation of the army, playing the statesman and the peacenik. Suddenly, everything looks normal, eerily, uncannily normal.

A beleaguered regime suddenly appears immaculate. Pakistan, which had seemed servile, acquires moderation and diplomatic initiative. There is no sense of escalation. The two nationalists fight like the choruses’, content with the noise they make. The Opposition shakes its head in disbelief, wondering about the credulity of the story.

One feels that something was rewritten in the process. The Opposition sensed almost intuitively what was wrong. The idea of security and secrecy was being applied to the democratic processes that demanded openness. It was a displacement of frameworks where fetishising the nation state was threatening democracy. The attack on the Opposition and dissenting journalists was the first key step. What accompanied it in a symptomatic way was the breakdown of language. While there were jingoistic celebrations in India, there was a sense of skepticism about India’s claims. As informed experts pointed out, what was threatening India was not critique but wrong information. It was as if the BJP wanted the film on Uri to do the talking, instead of tabling the relevant facts. The open defence of vigilante groups adds to the tension, with the RSS unable to differentiate between an appeal to Imran Khan and an appeal for peace. It is almost as if truth and peace have become anti-national activities.

But these are symptoms which can no longer be read discretely. Worldwide nationalism has become a form of paranoia. As Yugoslav writer Danilo Kis writes in his book, Homo Poeticus, “a set of individual paranoia raised to the degree of paroxysm”. Lost in the wilderness of middle-class anxiety, the individual takes on the collective portfolio of “keeping the nation (state) alive, protecting is prestige.” This self-appointed task where the regime and the vigilante groups announce that the nation or its security is safe in their hands, hides a deeper dimension of the problem. The frenzy, the hysteria, the sense of urgency and duty conveys an effluvium of concern without quite conveying the language of responsibility. The intimation of war allows you to distort the logic of everyday civics. The new grammar is what Kis calls relativism. The only index is that we should outdo, out-talk, outperform Pakistan. Whatever the means employed, one forgets it is a negation of our sense of civilisation. Nationalism creates a parallel world of certainties and loyalties which is oblivious of everyday politics. In fact, it is a denial of everyday politics. Security becomes a word for internal and external coping. The ‘enemy’ is Pakistani, Kashmiri and Muslim. The extension of the security net covers the tribal as Naxal and the dissenter. Search, label and destroy seem to mark every level of battle. The State elevates populism to the level of policy.

Rational critiques and reasoned doubts have little claim to public space. When Rahul Gandhi chides Modi, all he does is to tell him that the moment for the inauguration of the National War Memorial is a time for unity, hardly a time to crib about the Congress. It gets worse when The Hindu investigates the Rafale deal persistently, opening up issues of corruption, and one of the heroes of the Bofors investigation is now dubbed as anti-national. Bofors and Rafale are narratives read in separate ledgers. Modi has even said that the pre-emptive strike would have been even more effective with the Rafale jets.

One realises that India has split into two parallel worlds, one of hysterical nationalism, outdoing any RSS dream, and the other of everyday politics which the Opposition is desperately asking the nation to return to. Yet, everyday politics is dismal, while nationalism especially fought like a video game is entrancing. There is an enthusiasm for bloodthirstiness which no digital mob brutalising a stranger can produce.

Democracy has to learn to battle not only majoritarian tyranny, but also challenge the simulacra, the imagined realities of the nation state. The imagined world forces itself on the real world, redefining it. The simulacra, as Jean Baudrillard points out, becomes real in consequences and seeks to perpetuate itself in the world of the media. The surreal devastates the real, creating a new script where the State is the only voice and citizens an ‘aye-saying’ chorus. The nation state, as a paranoid reductive entity, reduces the diversity of others to an imagined threat it has to suppress. In battling these imaginary enemies, it devastates the idioms of the political system. One needs new imaginaries to revitalise the possibilities of democratic politics. Our everydayness has to be invented again if we have to survive as a decent society.

ibune News Service

Jammu, March 3

Chief of Army Staff Gen Bipin Rawat on Sunday visited various Army forward locations of Samba and Ratnuchak in the Jammu region to review the operational deployment and preparedness. On Saturday, he had visited the 16 Corps headquarters.

The area falls under the Western Command of the Army.

Giving details, a defence spokesman said the Army Chief was briefed about the situation and preparedness by General Officer Commanding, Rising Star Corps (9 Corps), Lt Gen JS Nain.

“The Army Chief interacted with the troops at forward locations and expressed complete confidence in the Army’s capabilities to thwart any nefarious design of enemies of our country and handle any situation,” he said.

General Rawat also praised the high state of morale and preparedness of the troops, he added.

His visit to the state is considered crucial with respect to the current ground situation after the Indian Air Force conducted airstrikes deep inside Pakistan. Since the Pulwama attack on February 14, the hostility between India and Pakistan has increased.

The Rising Star Corps is managing the second line of defence on the 198-km International Border whereas the BSF is at the forefront. On several occasions, Army installations of this corps have been targeted by terrorists after infiltrating from across the border. Being close to the border, the alertness of Army in the area has to be high to thwart any aggression of Pakistan.

The strategic import of the Balakot air strike will not be lost on the Pakistan army, which will be compelled to rethink its strategy in view of India’s willingness to use air power in the interests of national security. For the first time in decades, the Indian security establishment has overcome its hesitation to use air power in the proxy war waged by Pakistan.

Air Marshal Brijesh Jayal (retd)
Former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Western Air Command

THE Balakot air strike by the IAF’s Mirage-2000 aircraft has strategic security implications that transcend its immediate tactical significance. A formation of the IAF aircraft penetrated Pakistan’s air defences and successfully completed its mission despite the fact that the neighbouring country was on high alert after the Pulwama attack. Clearly, the IAF’s mission planning, tactics and execution proved too good for Pakistan’s air defence system. This is not for the first time that Pakistan’s air defences have been found wanting. They were also caught by surprise when US commandos neutralised Osama bin Laden in 2011, virtually in the neighbourhood of Pakistan’s military establishment. The question arises: why would the Pakistan Air Force, which is professionally recognised, neglect its air defences when it considers India an enemy with a strong air force?

Let’s rewind to the 1962 war when the Chinese army was threatening the Assam valley. At that time, White House intelligence reports had concluded that if India were to use combat air power, this would have a significant impact on the ground war. Yet US Ambassador John Galbraith advised India’s Defence Minister and the Prime Minister against the use of offensive air power, for fear of Chinese air force retaliation on Indian cities (such as Kolkata) and economic targets. Based on this advice, India failed to commit the IAF to an offensive role. The IAF top brass, too, failed to prevail upon the political leadership, even though air combat forces were available, joint structures with the Army were in place and there were the obvious limitations of the Chinese air force operating out of high-altitude airfields in Tibet.

This diffidence to use air power, anticipating retaliation, has somehow embedded itself in the psyche of the Indian security establishment. The mindset that the use of air power is escalatory manifested itself again during the Kargil conflict when the IAF was limited to operating within our own airspace and specifically forbidden from crossing the Line of Control (LoC). One keeps hearing similar sentiments expressed by security experts during debates in the electronic media.

The Pakistani military establishment has been quick to exploit this defensive Indian mindset and the window of opportunity it affords them. Knowing well, especially after the 1971 war, that India will always have an edge in conventional warfare, it has chosen the proxy war route to bleed India in Jammu and Kashmir ‘with a thousand cuts’. As this approach has paid them dividends and the Indian security establishment has come to live with the inevitability of the proxy war, Pakistan has built considerable ‘assets’ in the form of separatists and radical groups in J&K and other parts of the country. That it has well established training facilities like Balakot shows that this security template is there to stay. Indeed, it has used this template in Afghanistan as well.  Going nuclear has added to Pakistan’s confidence of being able to deter India while relentlessly pursuing their objective of targeting India and keeping its security forces tied up through the proxy war.

The strategic import of the Balakot mission will not be lost on the Pakistan army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi as India’s willingness to use air power to further its national security interests compels the former to rethink its strategy. It also puts a burden on them to commit resources and professionalise their air defences.

There are lessons for us as well. For the first time in decades, the Indian security establishment has overcome its hesitation to commit air power in the proxy war waged by Pakistan. One can only hope that having overcome this psychological barrier, the national security establishment will now be open to tapping the full potential and flexibility of air power in the interests of national security and not try to confine it to the Theatre Commands.

Even as Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman has been released, there are three questions the nation must ask itself and not be satisfied with woolly answers: Why was the IAF pilot flying a dated MiG-21 when his adversary was in a contemporary F-16? Why is the IAF so hopelessly short of its combat strength with many squadrons equipped with aged and obsolete aircraft? And can we stop politicising the Rafale purchase and let the induction process move ahead so that the morale of the IAF is not dented?

Rafale failed on several parameters but the Air Force, impressed by Mirage aircraft in Kargil war, remained insistent on jets from Dassault.

The CAG report tabled in Parliament recently tells us that the Indian Air Force wanted the Rafale fighter jets from day one. In fact, it wanted a jet from Dassault Aviation.

But the question is: Why?

Let us go back to the Kargil war in 1999. The Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft proved its capabilities and impressed the Air Force very much. In August 2000, the Air Force proposed the acquisition of 126 upgraded Mirage 2000 jets. This was shot down by the defence ministry as the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 1992 did not allow for a single-vendor purchase. The Air Force re-submitted its proposal in December 2001, saying it should be treated as a repeat purchase.

However, the insistence of the government to not get into a single-vendor deal led to a request for information (RFI) being issued for the acquisition of 126 medium-range combat aircraft. It largely consisted of single-engine jets: Dassault Mirage 2000-5 Mk.2, Lockheed Martin F-16, Mikoyan MiG-29, and Saab JAS 39 Gripen. Only the MiG-29 had twin engines.

But once Dassault closed the Mirage production and insisted on fielding only the Rafale, the acquisition was expanded to what became the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft or the MMRCA. This also got Boeing F-18 and the Eurofighter Typhoon into the competition. Russia changed its offering to the MiG-35.

Also read: India favoured Rafale also because of its ‘nuclear advantage’

The Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued to all these contenders in August 2007, with a demanding Air Staff Qualitative Requirement (ASQR), which led to most of the contending jets not satisfying it, warranting certain India-specific enhancements.

This was a drastic change from the IAF’s own argument as reported by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in March 2001 while re-submitting its proposal for Mirage 2000, in which the IAF had argued that “while other available options such as Rafale, Eurofighter, F-35, etc., were technologically superior to Mirage 2000, the excess combat capability of these aircraft would remain underutilised as Air Force requirement was a comparatively modest aircraft for shorter range missions.”

Although the IAF ran flight trials, none of the contenders were completely in compliance with its ASQR. The CAG report states: “In the Technical Evaluation conducted in May 2008, five of the six aircraft could not meet all the ASQR parameters. Four aircraft had one to two deviations. Rafale aircraft could not meet 9 ASQR parameters prescribed in the RFP.” On three separate occasions in 2009, the Rafale was rejected, but it managed to remain in the hunt in complete violation of the Defence Procurement Procedure.

Four aircraft were eliminated after the flight trials — the F-18, F-16, MiG-35 and the Gripen — because they did not meet the ASQR parameters of “growth potential” and “design maturity”. The CAG says: “There was no objective, verifiable or measurable criteria prescribed for evaluation of these parameters.”

However, the Rafale, which did not satisfy 14 parameters, made it to the IAF’s down select along with the Eurofighter. It is apparent that the IAF did not want certain jets. It didn’t want the American jets as it argued that “it could face difficulties in case sanctions were imposed by (the) USA”.

Also read: Buying complex weaponry is no easy business, but Rafale shows India’s process is broken

The IAF has since bought aircraft and helicopters from the US — the C-130, C-17, Apache and Chinook. The Indian Navy bought P8 aircraft. The Russian MiG-35 was not in the game at all as the IAF didn’t want Russian jets, which are notorious for high maintenance and operational costs — one of the reasons why lifecycle cost was the criteria in the RFP, as Russian jets are cheaper in direct acquisition costs but costlier in the long run.

A comparison can be taken from the CAG report on heavy lift helicopter acquisition. Total Life Cycle cost quoted by Boeing for Chinook helicopters was $1.47 billion and that by Rosoboronexport for Mi-26 was €8.40 billion. Direct acquisition cost was $1.20 billion and €1.06 billion, respectively.

The CAG report says that Dassault was non-compliant in ASQR, RFP and in violation of the DPP. It did not give complete information, and the columns it had left blank were filled by the Indian committee looking into lowest bidder (L1) under various assumptions.

Dassault Aviation was declared L1 and Eurofighter, which had provided all the details, was found to be L2! It was only during negotiations that it became apparent that the costs were going way beyond the quote, and the Dassault was no longer L1.

According to the CAG report, a team of defence ministry officials had submitted a report in March 2015, saying that Dassault’s bid should have been rejected at the technical evaluation stage. It said, “The acceptance of additional commercial proposal after bid submission date for capabilities, which were already prescribed in the RFP, was unprecedented and against the canons of financial propriety.”

Also read: The 4 IAS officers in the thick of the Rafale deal controversy

Yet, just days later on April 10, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a deal for 36 Rafale. Was the PM not aware of the defence ministry’s report? Or did he go ahead regardless hoping for a better deal? CAG report does not indicate a better deal. It is Dassault that laughed all the way to the bank.

Various reasons are attributed to why the IAF wanted the Rafale — comfort with Dassault, Indo-France strategic ties, procuring weapons from France that are seen as sanctions proof and also a nuclear weapons delivery role.

This raises questions on the gaps that exists in understanding the needs and reasons of the IAF and the armed forces in general for certain weapons systems with the civilian leadership. If the IAF wanted only the Mirage and later the Rafale, then why wasn’t a government to government deal done earlier? DPP-2006 allows for an inter-governmental agreement.

If an IGA had been done in 2007, the Rafale jets would have been a lot cheaper and the Air Force would have already had the 126 jets it requires. In fact, the total requirement is 200-250 Rafale kind of jets. There was no need to have a sham tender that made a mockery of procedures and rules, because this has sent a very wrong message to weapons’ manufacturers across the world.

India is going to run what is dubbed MMRCA 2.0. It has got responses from the same contenders as MMRCA 1.0. The CAG report will be read by foreign suppliers. They will see how the MRCA tender played out. A competing vendor told noted defence journalist Saurabh Joshi, “If you’re permitting cheating, at least have the decency to not make the rest of us work so hard.” Will they respond to the RFP that’s due to be released?

Yusuf T. Unjhawala is the editor of Defence Forum India and a commentator on defence and strategic affairs. He tweets @YusufDFI

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Nurpur, February 17

The family of Sepoy Masar Deen (35) was shattered as soon as the news of his sudden demise reached Riyali village in Fatehpur on Sunday. He had a heart attack yesterday and died in a Manipur hospital. He was with the Assam Rifles 25-Battalion and is survived by his wife and three sons. Sources said the body would arrive at the village tonight.

Prem Sharma, naib tehsildar, has announced relief for the bereaved family. — OC