India’s stance on relations with China has remained steadfast. It has always emphasised that peace and respect for the LAC are precursors to normalising ties.

Lt Gen Pradeep Bali Retd

WHILE the standoff on the Line

of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh continues, India’s stance on the border issue has remained steadfast. National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, while interacting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently on the sidelines of a meeting of the BRICS NSAs, emphasised that peace and respect for the LAC were precursors to the normalisation of India-China relations.

External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has also been reiterating this stand during his interactions with his Chinese counterpart, in Kazakhstan and Laos in July this year during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and ASEAN Plus meeting, respectively. A few days ago, speaking at the Global Centre for Security Policy in Geneva, Jaishankar said while negotiations were underway, about 75 per cent of the disengagement issues at the LAC had been resolved. He again highlighted that while there was violence between the militaries of the two countries, the rest of the bilateral relationship could not be insulated from it.

There cannot be a clearer statement from the political executive about the state of affairs, future expectations and prerequisites for peace. Like Jaishankar, Wang Yi has also been a career diplomat, adept at handling sensitive situations. Beijing’s stance has always been ambiguous, emphasising on niceties and engagement, with the Chinese media, controlled by the Communist Party, often misquoting contents of bilateral exchanges to gain a perceived moral high ground. Though there are indications of some progress in resolving dispute points in Ladakh, but caution should always remain the buzzword in dealing with China.

The Chinese are used to picking quarrels, flexing military muscle and browbeating their neighbours. This is particularly so with countries having legitimate claims in the South China Sea (SCS). While bullying is the hallmark of its diplomacy, whether it is Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines or the WHO, it may not have bargained for such a firm resolve from India. In fact, China’s inability to ride roughshod in the border dispute with India seems to have become a major irritant that it finds problematic to handle. It would surely wish to resolve the disputes along the LAC, entirely on its terms. Despite having been stymied at Doklam in south-west Bhutan or in east Ladakh, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has circumvented any disadvantage by encroaching upon Bhutan on the eastern flank of the Chumbi valley and by optimum use of the terrain that favours it along the LAC in Ladakh.

Among China’s pressing security concerns, like the Taiwan issue, sovereignty disputes with Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN nations in the SCS, the Himalayan borders appear to be the most vexing as the opponent can match up to it. Often enough, the difference between India and China in terms of comprehensive national power, which includes not only military muscle but also technology and economy, gets highlighted as a major concern for India. That may well be, but an armed conflict across the LAC will not be a viable option for China, and what Prime Minister Modi told Russia about “this not being an era of war,” is equally applicable to Communist China. Instead, it will continuously endeavour to gain advantages through skirmishes on the northern border, while talking about peace and engagement. This would keep its manufactured claims alive and help in tying down India to an extent.

The clear answer for India lies in considering the LAC in a holistic manner and not have a compartmentalised approach. Theatre commands have been on the anvil for quite some time and finally seem to be taking shape.

However, before a joint tri-services structure fructifies, it is imperative that the Army should look at a comprehensive application of its formations, from eastern Arunachal until Ladakh. Along the vast and hostile terrain in Kameng, Subansiri and beyond until the Lohit valley, the topography offers advantages to our forces.

The watershed in Sikkim, especially in the east, which overlooks the Chumbi valley, is probably the most dominant stretch from the Indian perspective. Any threats being posed in Ladakh or elsewhere by the PLA need to be effectively countered by a show of force as appropriate, in such advantageous areas, giving a clear signalling of intent when required, by stressing on quid-pro-quo options. This orchestration can only be effective if the LAC is seen from a single prism, and not war-gamed in terms of respective sectors.

With the exception of the tactical pre-emption displayed in occupying the important heights on the Kailash Range, which compelled the PLA to cede ground, we have been mostly reactive in countering Chinese perfidy along the LAC. While the terrain across the LAC favours the PLA in terms of faster build-up of troops and equipment and logistic support riding on better infrastructure, the geographical disadvantages do get balanced in terms of resolute military application, especially in the east. The tardy development in border areas is also now being overcome at a steady pace, despite the terrain challenges.

The Chinese have a penchant for continuously changing the goal posts and not adhering to border peace agreements. They always adopt a maximalist position while staking claims in any dispute and combine it with bullying tactics to browbeat an adversary. However, the Chinese leadership, which is firmly in control at present, recognises and respects the strength and will of an adversary that does not blink easily. This will weigh with the Chinese leadership, even though considering the geopolitical realities of the world today and the stakes of major powers involved, India may find itself largely alone in facing up to its northern adversary.

India would also be well served by adopting an ambivalent stance on Tibet and Taiwan and being more vocal on Uighur issues in Xinjiang.

For us, being proactive does not necessarily imply being aggressive, but rather being pre-emptive in our plans and actions to counter China’s designs by outguessing it. It also means having credible deterrence capabilities, which are a must against China. Proactive diplomacy, in tandem with the efforts of our armed forces on the borders, should continue to be the defining character of our policy in dealing with Beijing.