Sanjha Morcha

Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd) Military Commentator THE news that the Army is considering a proposal to allow civilians to join the force for three years, claimed to be an effort to attract talented young people, is laughable. How does one attract good talent with the offer of just three years’ service? What will be the utility of an officer when taken in for such a short period is the question the higher command needs to address. The proposal is part of efforts to bring in reforms in the 13 lakh-strong Army. The military appears to be under pressure to cut its expenses in every possible manner. This is in keeping with the proposal to reduce the defence budget. The military’s higher command, in response to this demand from the government, is going about like a bull in a china shop rather than applying its mind and standing up for what is inescapable for national security. Several committees have looked into reorganising the Army, essentially to cut costs, reduce teeth-to-tail ratio, make the Army more efficient (lean and mean, a phrase often used) and improve the career prospects of the officer cadre. Still, there appears to be continuing pressure on the military to further decrease expenses. There is little realisation that in areas of national defence, as in life, some things do not come cheap. However, the government (MoD) has been cherrypicking only those recommendations of various committees that conform to its thinking and plans. Thus, many of the more useful recommendations of the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee and more recently those of the Shekatkar Committee have been left out. Since most of the recommendations are interlinked, so when you do ‘cherrypicking’, it leads to disruptions and complications and the end result is often the opposite of what was intended. The number of civilian employees paid out of the defence budget is around 3.75 lakh. These are from various groups such as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), ordnance factories, Military Engineer Services (MES), defence PSUs. MoD, etc. Though they are around 25 per cent of the strength of the defence forces, in terms of pay, allowances and pensions, their take-home, in proportionate terms, is much higher. This is due to non-functional financial upgradation (NFFU) granted to these civilian employees and the availability of far more vacancies for them in higher pay bands, compared to those in the defence forces. Further, their advancement in career to higher pay bands (due to NFFU) comes with far shorter service than that of defence forces officers. Thus, an officer in Class A service — most of them among these 3.75 lakh are in this class — climbs to the pay band of a joint secretary to the Government of India with 19 years of service, while a Major General, unfairly equated with a joint secretary, gets to that pay band after around 29 years of service. This group of 3.75 lakh is the actual tail that needs drastic pruning and yet it has never been touched. In the defence forces, there are about 20 in the apex scale of pay, whereas among these civilians, with a far smaller cadre strength, the figure is well over 100. Nearly 70 per cent of the Army’s budget is tailored towards revenue expenditure, leaving little money for other essential requirement of modernisation etc. A former Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Arun Prakash (retd) highlighted this aspect in an article. What seems to be missed out is that revenue expenditure is 70 per cent because the budget itself is small (during 2019-20, it was about 1.46 per cent of the GDP). If the allocation for defence were to be 3 per cent of the GDP (as proposed by the Parliamentary Committee of Defence), this percentage would perhaps come down to 40 per cent or less of the defence budget. A review of the officer cadre involves the ratio between regular and short service cadre and rank structure of various appointments within the service. In the past, the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee recommended a ratio of 1:1.1 between the regular and short service cadre. The more appropriate ration should be 60:40 (60 per cent regular and 40 per cent short service). The authorised strength of the officer cadre of the Army is nearly 40,000. Presently, the shortage of officers is around 12,000; it has persisted all along and impacts the performance of units. Presently, the short service commission officers serve up to 10 years, extendable to 14. Such length of service has drawbacks and problems of readjustment and re-employment in civil life. Equally, such terms and conditions of service just cannot attract good material. On the proposed three years of service, the utility of officers employed for such a short period would be highly suspect. We will end up being flooded with officers of the Captain rank, released from the Army, who will be going around looking for odd jobs in the civil market, which will have its own impact on the military’s standing in civil society. To draw on the right material that can meet the demands of exacting standards of performance in the defence services, the terms and conditions offered for short service commission have to be attractive enough. Therefore, the duration of the short service should be five years with additional four months for training. Their academic qualification should be Class XII (science stream) or graduation. As regards their resettlement, a small percentage may be absorbed in regular commission and all others given assured admission and free technical education with stipend for the duration of their education. Some can be absorbed in CPOs and central civil services. Those who wish to altogether opt out should be given an appropriate one-time financial grant. These officers could be given CSD canteen facilities. Finally, from what has been appearing in the press, asking the military to accept second-grade weapons and equipment, reducing the strength of officers and men in units, and changing organisations of field formations throws up a dismal picture. Possibly, we are moving closer to our state that prevailed before 1962. The military’s higher command owes it to the nation to keep the country safe and stand up for national security interests.

CDS Gen. Bipin Rawat had said IAF was planning to buy the indigenous LCA Tejas instead of 114 ‘Make in India’ foreign jets.

Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria, head of the Indian Air Force | Photo: ANI

Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria, head of the Indian Air Force | Photo: ANI
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New Delhi: Four days after Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Bipin Rawat said the Indian Air Force was planning to switch over to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) ‘Tejas’ rather than pursue a global tender for 114 new fighter jets, Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria has contradicted him.

Bhadauria said Monday that the list of aircraft planned to be inducted by the IAF includes 36 Rafales, 114 multirole fighter aircraft, 100 advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) and over 200 LCAs in different variants.

Rawat had told news agency Bloomberg last week that the IAF “is switching to the LCA” when asked about the global tender for jets.

“The IAF is saying, I would rather take the indigenous fighter, it is good,” he was quoted as saying.

The CDS’ words came as a setback for the likes of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Saab, who were in the race for the contract for 114 aircraft, which would be worth at least 15 billion dollars and would also entail technology transfer under ‘Make in India’.

However, IAF chief Bhadauria told news agency ANI Monday: “This project (114 jets) is in the middle-weight and is in the Rafale class, in this issue, we will deal with it in the Make in India region, with an increase in FDI, with support to the private sector. I think in future this will bring in technology which is required to support the aviation sector. I think it is important to have another generation of aircraft in terms of capability, technology as we go along (sic).”

Also read: Dassault, Boeing and Saab — the front-runners for IAF’s 114 fighter jet contract


Separate programmes

When the CDS had made his comments last week, they had come as a surprise to the Air Force and industry. Sources had explained to ThePrint that the 114 jets cannot be replaced by the 83 LCA as the two fighters are of different classes.

“The IAF projections take into account the 83 LCA Mk 1A, Rafale, the 114 foreign fighters under Make in India, and even the AMCA,” a source had said.

Another source, who was involved in the negotiations for 83 LCAs, said it was wrong to mix up two separate programmes.

Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria also said his force is planning to acquire 450 fighter aircraft for deployment on the northern and western frontiers of the country over the next 35 years.

Regardless, the IAF will not reach its sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons by 2042, its projections have revealed.

The best-case scenario is if the force inducts the Tejas Mark 2, the AMCA and 114 fighter aircraft, for which a request for proposal is still awaited.