Lt Gen Retd Vinayak Patankar

The rural population showed greater inclination to participate at the hustings, even defying threats from terrorists.

THE Election Commission of India’s (ECI) announcement on holding the three-phase Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir brought back memories of the landmark polls held in September-October 2002. While the forthcoming elections would be the first in the Union Territory, the one in 2002 was also significant for several reasons.

While there has been a rise in terror attacks in the Jammu region in the recent past, it was the Kashmir valley that had witnessed an escalation of terror activities in 2002. It was the first time that the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) participated in the Assembly polls. There was a call for boycotting the elections, given by the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat. This was also the first poll in J&K in which EVMs (electronic voting machines) were used.

Even before the announcement of the dates of the four-phase elections was made, it was widely known that they were in the offing. While the PDP had pulled out all stops to reach out to the electorate, the J&K National Conference appeared to be relying on its solid organisational structure down to the grassroots level in its traditional strongholds. While the political parties had already begun their preparations, the official machinery had also started gearing up for the important event. It included, besides the Central and state governments, various security forces and intelligence services. The dynamic security situation was being closely watched and discussed regularly at the Unified Command Headquarters.

It was apparent that the security situation was widely different in urban and rural areas. The terrorists, wanting to make their presence felt, were more active in towns and cities, which had a large concentration of population, rather than in sparsely populated villages and hamlets. The urban population, which enjoyed better civic amenities, had more time to participate in political activities. In those areas, it was relatively easier for terrorists to enlist overground workers and quasi-political organisations like the Hurriyat. In mofussil areas, daily life was hard in the absence of basic facilities like medical treatment, supply of water and electricity which left little time for politics, except at the local level. The urban population was thus more polarised along existing political lines, whereas rural folk looked forward to the polls as an opportunity to have their say to improve their lives. In the rural areas, the enthusiasm to vote in the elections was palpable, especially among the youth and first-time voters. Interestingly, the rural population showed greater inclination to participate at the hustings, even defying threats and intimidation from terrorists and at times tearing posters warning voters of dire consequences.

The first phase of the elections was to be held on September 16, 2002. James Michael Lyngdoh, then Chief Election Commissioner, visited Srinagar a few times in the weeks prior to that to hold detailed discussions with the state administration and oversee polling arrangements. He was unequivocal in emphasising that he would accept no mismanagement at booths and would order repolling as many times as needed to ensure free and fair polling.

After the official announcement of the election schedule, the elected state government went into suspended animation and the Governor, Girish Saxena, took charge. About a week prior to the first round of polling, he held a meeting to take stock of the situation and satisfy himself that all was in readiness for the big event. Apart from officials directly involved in the conduct of polling, the meeting was attended by local heads of various security forces, intelligence agencies, senior bureaucrats of the state government and a few others. At the end of the meeting, the Governor wanted to know what in our estimate would be the percentage of polling (voter turnout). As he went around the room, the estimates varied from 10 to 20 per cent. The Army’s estimate of ‘nothing less than 40 per cent’ seemed too optimistic to all present, including the Governor.

By the evening of September 16, reports of polling started pouring in. As expected, the percentage was low in urban areas, but that from the countryside were above 40 per cent; in fact, in remote areas along the border regions and the Line of Control, where the number of voters was small, it was as high as 80 per cent! The overall turnout that day was almost 48 per cent.

Pakistan’s proxies had already increased their activities to somehow force the cancellation of the elections or at least impede the process. It had also stepped up its propaganda broadcasts on radio and TV. An amusing incident occurred on September 16. That evening, in a round-up of news from ‘India-occupied Kashmir’, a Pakistani TV channel showed fake footage of ‘unwilling voters’ being ‘pulled out from their houses to cast their votes’ by Indian security forces, besides other ‘atrocities’ being committed by them. The red-faced channel had to withdraw the story in a hurry as it became known that there was no polling in that constituency that day, having been countermanded following the death of a candidate due to cardiac arrest!

All four phases of the elections were conducted smoothly. At the planning stage, the ECI felt that it had a tough assignment ahead; various agencies involved in holding the elections also considered it to be a challenging task. However, the skeptics and naysayers were proved wrong in the end. While the ECI, along with the state and Central governments deserved to be applauded for the successful conduct of the election, the real winners were the people of J&K.

In the end, the elections reflected the true will of the people. People elected those in whom they placed their trust to make a fresh start with a new dispensation. It was a victory of the ballot over the bullet, a paradigm shift in the political landscape of J&K.