Any blockade of the Malacca Strait could result in the Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The reverse is also possible: a blockade of Taiwan by China could lead to the closure of the Malacca Strait.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

FROM the 48th floor sea-facing room at Oakwood Hotel in Sri Racha, Thailand, overlooking the Gulf of Thailand, I see an oil refinery being built by some 200 Indian employees of the multinational, Petrofac. Unlike in the adjoining dispute-ridden, China-claimed South China Sea, the Thai Gulf is tranquil. The growth of China, the world’s second biggest economy, depends on an uninterrupted supply of energy, which suffers from a Malacca dilemma.

During his marathon briefing on Monday, eve of Army Day, Chief of Army Staff, Gen Upendra Dwivedi said the LAC was sensitive but stable (earlier it was unpredictable). China calls the shots there; India reacts. Time it turned the tables elsewhere: possibly the Malacca Strait in the Indian Ocean where India has the upper hand for now.

Along the narrow neck of southern Myanmar and Thailand, connecting the Malaysia peninsula to the Asian mainland, is the Isthamus of Kra, called Devil’s Neck, like our own Chicken’s Neck in the Siliguri corridor which is being hedged under the Kaladan Multi-Modal project through Sittwe port in Myanmar.

Across Kra, Thailand, prodded by China, had sought to make a canal; now a 90-km land bridge is to join the Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean with the Gulf of Thailand in the South China Sea/Pacific Ocean to bypass the Malacca Strait.

An alternative passage avoiding the Malacca Strait will inflict severe strategic and economic loss on Malacca’s custodians — Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia — and alter maritime dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: depriving India of a strategic choke point in the Indian Ocean to offset its diminished deterrence against China along the LAC.

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China’s Malacca dilemma is the stuff of legend. At a Chinese Communist Party meeting in 2003, the then President Hu Jintao mentioned the lack of alternative routes and vulnerability of the Malacca Strait to naval blockade. As much as 90 per cent of China’s trade is by sea, including 80 per cent of oil and 60 per cent of gas. The Strait of Malacca is 80 km long, 65-to-150 km wide and 2.8 km at its narrowest point.

From Malacca town, I could see the other side. Around 250 ships use it daily; it is congested with cargo ships and will reach its capacity by 2030. A closure of Malacca by accident or design will cost $85 million a week. During the Gulf War, Indian warships escorted US shipping through the Malacca Strait.

China has weighed its Malacca diversion options: alternative routes, a new passage and enhancement of detterence to use the existing route. Alternative routes are available further south of the Malacca Strait through Sunda, Lombok and the Macassar Strait. These are shallow for submarines and involve two-to-three days of additional sailing (1500 nm), incurring added cost, which a Thai estimate puts at an astounding $200 billion a year.

The Maritime Silk and Belt and Road initiatives launched in 2013 were designed to protect China’s land routes and sea lanes of communication for energy. Three land corridors were envisaged: the $65-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from Gwadar to Xinjiang; the China-Nepal Economic Corridor (CNEC), which is at the design stage, and the $7-billion partly developed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) from Kyaukphyu to Kunming, containing road, rail and oil and gas pipelines with SEZs.

China is acquiring military bases and access to ports and airfields to dominate the Indian Ocean Region — the Djibouti military base, Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (99-year lease in Sri Lanka), Kyaukphyu and Coco island (Myanmar) and Ream (Cambodia) in the Gulf of Thailand. Negotiations are on with Madagascar, Comoros, the Seychelles and Mauritius for use of/access to military facilities.

India, too, is creating strategic assets in Mauritius, the Seychelles and Myanmar, coupled with bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. China is a loner.

In November 2023, the then Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin presented the design to bypass the Malacca Strait and ports in Singapore and Malaysia, with a land bridge from Ranong and Chumphon, both deep sea container ports in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. In September 2024, Transport Minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit said the South-Eastern Corridor connecting Bimstec and Asean countries with the Indo-Pacific would come into effect in September 2025, the construction would commence in 2026 and the project completed in 2030. In August 2024, PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra confirmed that Thailand would seek Chinese investment for the $27-35-billion project.

For enhancing deterrence in the Indian Ocean, Beijing had shifted the military focus from the PLA to the PLA Navy (PLAN). It is now the fastest growing naval armada in the world, transforming from a brown-water navy to a blue-water one, crossing the First Island Chain and implementing the Two-Oceans Strategy — the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By 2035, it will be a 390-ship navy with seven aircraft carriers, frontline warships and submarines, hugely surpassing the US navy.

In the event of a blockade of the Malacca Strait by the US and/or India, which is an act of war, China may not attempt to break the blockade as it has three months of strategic oil reserves, with plans to make it last for 18 months and replenishing from Uzbekistan and Russia.

Any blockade of the Malacca Strait could result in the Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The reverse is also possible: a blockade of Taiwan by China could lead to the closure of the Malacca Strait. Further, a blockade or invasion of Taiwan independent of action against Malacca will also harm India’s economy.

In such contingencies, as per the India-US cooperative deterrence — the Indo-Pacific Strategy — New Delhi should align its maritime domain expertise and naval capability in the Indian Ocean while the US focus should be in the Pacific Ocean. As PLAN’s blue-water proficiency would take a decade to manifest, India should exploit more imaginatively China’s Malacca dilemma to alter the adverse balance along the LAC. Or, will the Kra land bridge become China’s hedge?