The Indian establishment has been ambivalent in its approach to the resolution of the crisis in Manipur.

Maj Gen Retd Amrit Pal Singh

THE September 1 drone bomb attack on Koutruk and Kadangband villages in Manipur’s Imphal West district marked an escalation in the violence between the Kukis and Meiteis. Two persons were killed and nine injured in this first such use of drones by insurgents to target civilians. This was followed by more attacks the next day. They destroyed three India Reserve Battalion bunkers at Meikhang village in Imphal East district.

Since the security forces have explicit ‘shoot-at-sight’ orders against those crossing the buffer zone between the valley and the hill tribes, this new mode of attack could become the preferred tactic by insurgents. These weaponised drones can operate between 500 m and 15 km. Capable of carrying various explosives, including hand grenades and mortar bombs, these can hover and capture images, adding to the threat complexity. Their value lies not just in their destructive ability, but also in documenting the kills.

The recent attacks targeted Meitei-dominated villages. The Kuki-Zo militias are suspected to be behind these attacks. The use of drones to target civilians has been documented since August 2021, when such attacks were witnessed in the neighbouring Myanmar, in areas bordering Mizoram, not far from south Manipur. The drones were being used by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) against forces of the Myanmarese junta. The PDF is the armed wing of the Myanmarese National Unity Government, which has been Myanmar’s government-in-exile since the military junta-led coup in February 2021. It now controls all areas across the Manipur border, except the two pockets of Moreh and Ukhrul. Some hardware and ammunition/bombs could have been sold by the PDF and other Myanmar rebel groups (some supported by China) to valley-based banned Meitei groups and groups of Chin-Kuki ethnicity that fuel the conflict in Manipur.

The security forces in the beleaguered Manipur are too busy separating the warring factions to guard the Indo-Myanmar border. Armed cadres belonging to the radicalised militia Arambai Tenggol and separatist terror group United National Liberation Front (UNLF) openly roam the streets and flaunt weapons (including those looted from state police armouries in May, last year). This, despite a peace agreement signed between the UNLF and the Centre in the presence of Home Minister Amit Shah in November, last year. Taking advantage of the ambiguity in the peace accord, UNLF cadres have not been restricted to camps and designated areas. Nor have weapons been withdrawn by the state government, which uses these Meitei militias to dominate the Imphal valley with impunity and challenge the remit of the Army and Assam Rifles (AR) checkpoints.

The Army, AR and Central Armed Police Forces, which made tremendous sacrifices in the past while waging a successful battle against separatist elements, have effectively been sidelined by the removal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from the Meitei-dominated Manipur valley. The Army and the AR face a serious challenge in maintaining the fragile internal security situation, controlled by the predominantly Meitei state government. This freedom accorded by the state government to the factions responsible for last year’s ethnic violence in Manipur is a serious security concern; the possibility of orchestrated violence or an offensive against the Kuki-Zo tribals and an escalation in armed response remains.

Two extraordinary threats to India’s security have manifested themselves in the past four years. One threat is that of the Chinese incursions in Ladakh, which saw the occupation of Depsang, Chumar and Chang Chenmo by China’s People’s Liberation Army. Despite several rounds of negotiations and mutual disengagement in the Pangong Tso lake area, the status quo ante has not been restored, as demanded by the Indian Government. While the security forces are being augmented by weapon and equipment procurements (an inordinately long process), a gradual sidelining and deliberate diversion from the issue of incursions by the government and the media have fostered a sense of acceptance in the minds of the populace. This is an encouragement to China in many ways.

The second threat is the situation in Manipur that had been festering since early 2023 and escalated in May 2023. The ineptitude of the state government and the subsequent induction of 60,000 paramilitary forces and the Army by the Centre has not resulted in the de-escalation of violence. Conversely, new dimensions have emerged in the attacks, as the recent drone bombings show.

The ongoing disturbances in Manipur have a debilitating effect on security as the open, porous border with Myanmar is ripe for exploitation. The Indian establishment has been ambivalent in its approach to the resolution of the crisis in Manipur. In the initial period, after clashes broke out in May 2023, the Centre had rushed Central and Army forces into the state. But thanks to a lack of coordination and partisan handling of the state police forces, which are predominantly Meitei, there was no let-up in the ethnic clashes. Then, in last December, the government took its eye off the ball and entered the General Election mode. Consequently, national security was relegated to local political expediency.

The escalation through drone bombings is an act of terror. The new level of the destabilising effects of a prolonged conflict and the exploitation of the situation by China should be of concern to the security establishment. Let us hope that it doesn’t come to a point when concerted military action will be the only solution to the crisis.