If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options.
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THE Agnipath scheme came under scrutiny during the just-concluded session of Parliament. It also made headlines during the recent Lok Sabha elections. In a traditional army like ours, the introduction of a scheme that changes its basic structure must be backed by strong and cogent reasons.
Even though not so stated, the main reason for the change was to reduce the pension expenditure, thus saving money for the modernisation of the defence forces. That is understandable, since over 70 per cent of the defence Budget currently goes into meeting the revenue needs. Pensions have been singled out as a major drain. The One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme has been vilified, though unfairly. There are many other categories of pensioners who have been beneficiaries of the OROP or its equivalent. Soldiers only started getting benefits of the scheme in 2015, after over three decades of struggle. The number of pensioners is on the rise because of their longer life span. But this trend is temporary. Statistically, the numbers entering the pension scheme and those exiting it are likely to plateau soon.
Unfortunately, India does not have a defence culture. An average citizen has scant knowledge of or interest in the subject. There is an age-old wish for the defence forces: ‘may there never be wanting, and may they never be wanted’. A good army does not keep the country secure by fighting a war, but by preventing one. It does this through deterrence by remaining fully equipped, trained and ready. To keep it thus ever ready entails costs.
When an annual review is done, all ministries and departments show a tangible utilisation of the allocated funds. This is done by counting additional highways, universities, hospitals, airports, etc. But those entrusted with keeping the country safe have nothing to show in physical terms. The fact that every other development has been possible because of them is often overlooked. Their contribution is not perceptible, and their expenses are liable to be misconstrued as being wasteful. Consequently, they are the first to come in the crosshairs of the cost-cutting measures.
The Army’s manpower is internally reviewed regularly. However, it needs to be remembered that weapons and technology per se do not win wars; it is the soldier who does. If that were not true, Israel, with far superior weapons and technology, would have achieved its avowed aim of finishing the ragtag Hamas a long time ago. But Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant is desperately asking for 10,000 additional soldiers.
India has over 15,000 km of land borders. These run through the toughest terrain in the world. The situation on some 7,000 km of the land border remains perpetually active, calling for the deployment of troops. It is debatable whether the 12 lakh-strong Army is too large. Although Pakistan is no pole star, it is pertinent to remember that our western neighbour — with less than one-fourth of our size and nearly one-seventh of our population and an economy in a shambles — is maintaining 6.5 lakh personnel. By that yardstick, our defence forces’ strength should be around 33 lakh instead of the present more than 14 lakh personnel. With our booming economy, the incessant drumbeat of our Army being too large and causing a burgeoning expenditure needs to be muted.
Maintaining peace and security is not the purview of the Army alone. It requires a synergy of diplomatic, economic, political and other factors. Unfortunately, our relations with our immediate neighbours have remained strained over the years. It falls to the Army to ‘manage’ those relations by keeping the adversaries at bay. This underscores the need for keeping a strong army.
As a result of the suspension of recruitment in the Covid-19 years, while retirements continued, the Army manpower had come down by nearly two lakh. Luckily, there was no war during the period. If considered prudent by the security policymakers, that reduced strength can be institutionalised. But whatever is retained must be homogenous. A hybrid army comprising a mix of regular and contractual soldiers cannot match a cohesive force.
After controversy erupted, certain benefits of the Agnipath scheme were put forward. One is the lowering of the age profile by two/three years. It may be mentioned that after the 1962 war debacle, the Army had sent out teams to different theatres to carry out physical tests at varying altitudes. Based on their findings, mandatory standards were prescribed for annual battle physical efficiency tests. Interestingly, the standards for all aged from 18 to 35 years were exactly the same. The age factor, therefore, is more of a post-event justification than a factor in favour of the continuation of the scheme.
It is true that the short service commission officers who served for five or 10 years performed laudably well in wars. But officers serve as leaders, where they take individual decisions at the cutting edge. The soldiers, on the contrary, always work as a team in which esprit de corps is their glue. This is difficult to achieve in a disparate group.
It has also been reported that an internal survey of the Army found the scheme to have merit. The reality, however, is that the system does not allow the Army to publicly express disagreement with a government scheme. All internal analyses get dovetailed into support for the decision that has already been taken; it is not examined critically.
If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options. For one, the NCC (National Cadet Corps) scheme can be expanded and more Army personnel can be involved in the training than at present.
The only known benefit of the scheme is bringing down the pension expenditure. This is clearly and quotably visible. The serious drawbacks of the scheme will only be known in the event of a war. But it will be too late by then.