Sanjha Morcha

A Jammu shift in Pakistani strategy

Moving the terror target area is clearly aimed at ‘giving relief’ to Kashmiri population

Jyoti Malhotra

PRIME Minister Narendra Modi is likely to inaugurate the first train run from Reasi in Jammu region to Baramulla in Kashmir later this month, across the world’s highest bridge over the Chenab river — a sight to send the spirits soaring — but the question is, will the PM’s presence reassure the region’s gnawing anxiety triggered by the recent spate of terror attacks south of the Pir Panjal?

Pakistan’s all-powerful military establishment cannot fail to notice that despite PM Modi’s reduced numbers in Parliament, he is travelling the world and being feted by it too.

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The last few weeks have reminded one of a blood-soaked metronome: Five soldiers killed in Kathua district on July 8. Eight persons, including six terrorists, killed in Kulgam on July 7. Three terrorists killed in Doda district on June 26. Nine pilgrims killed in Reasi district on June 9, the day PM Modi was being sworn in in Delhi.

Whatever happened to ‘sab changa si?’ As the BJP-ruled Centre prepares to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the revocation of Article 370 from Jammu & Kashmir less than a month from now, the question on subdued lips and depressed tongues is, why have terror attacks moved from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley to Hindu-majority Jammu?

First, the facts. The terrorists carrying out the attacks are foreign, meaning, they are from Pakistan; no other foreign terrorists — whether Afghans, Chechens, etc — have been found here. Second, they carry sophisticated weapons, such as the US-made M4 carbine assault rifles, more often found in the Afghan theatre rather than in J&K. Third, they are highly trained to carry out the attacks. Fourth, these terrorists have infiltrated into the Jammu region from the forested, international boundary (IB) section — dotted by fast-flowing streams that they use to swim across — and not really across the Line of Control.

Don’t be too surprised that the IB can be infiltrated. In Reasi, Doda, Kathua and Samba, the ground is soft, and in the past, terrorists have sneaked in via tunnels. In more modern times, Pakistani drones have done the job — including a drone attack over Jammu’s airbase in 2021.

Most importantly, the shift in Pakistani strategy — shifting the target area from Kashmir to Jammu — has been clearly done with an eye to “giving relief” to the Kashmiri population. The Valley is so closely monitored that it is difficult for a leaf to fall without the security establishment knowing about the speed, angle and distance of the falling leaf from the ground well in advance. There is not an iota of doubt that large parts of Kashmir are among the most militarised in the world. The cost of speaking up or against the establishment is so high that people would much rather mind their own business.

Not so in the Jammu region. The securitisation of these parts has been far more relaxed, notwithstanding the constant spate of attacks in the Poonch-Rajouri sector — Hindu-majority Jammu was seen to be more nationalist, less problematic. In fact, things were so laid back that in the summer of 2020, soon after the Chinese were discovered trampling all over the Line of Actual Control, a brigade of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) was moved to eastern Ladakh. The thinning out has cost Jammu dear. Only now has the brigade been replaced with some reservists.

Something else has also been happening here, though that isn’t directly related to the security situation but gives you some idea of the shifting winds — the surprising weakening of the BJP, that too in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370.

It wasn’t supposed to be like this. The abrogation was supposed to further integrate Jammu with the rest of the country. Instead, local residents are now complaining about increasing unemployment, rising inflation, the sale of land to outsiders, a rise in the liquor business as well as the shutting down of the 500,000-strong Durbar move from Srinagar which gave a shot in the arm to local business.

The recent Lok Sabha elections demonstrated some of that unhappiness. Although the BJP handsomely won the seats of Udhampur (Jitendra Singh defeated Choudhary Lal Singh, 51.28 per cent votes against 40.11 per cent) and Jammu (Jugal Kishore Sharma defeated Raman Bhalla, 52.8 per cent votes against 42.4 per cent), their victory margins were much lower — less than 1.5 lakh votes each. Even the ruling party seemed a bit surprised that this was happening.

Perhaps, that is what the Pakistani terrorist was seeking to do — undermine the government’s claims of normalcy, in the run-up to the fifth anniversary of the abrogation, even in Jammu. Some analysts point out that the level of the terror attacks is still more or less controlled, lest it invite greater retaliation, even if the tactics have changed (In Kashmir, the fidayeen attack was intended to cause as much destruction as possible, say in a camp site; but in the Jammu attacks, these have shifted to ambushes on armed patrols as well as civilian vehicles).

Perhaps, there is another reason. Pakistan’s all-powerful military establishment cannot fail to notice that despite PM Modi’s reduced numbers in Parliament, he is travelling the world and being feted by it too. Perhaps, Rawalpindi is hoping that these attacks will shake New Delhi out of its complacency and force it to recognise that the “Pakistani hand” is still integral to finding a solution and even lasting peace.

Still, it is amply clear that Modi responds much more to pressure within. Like from Punjab, which forced the opening of the Kartarpur Sahib corridor in 2019, Kashmir’s opportunity will come when the Assembly elections are held in the next few months. No one will be able to ignore J&K’s elected representatives from the Valley as well as from Jammu — neither Delhi, nor Rawalpindi. There will be a moment at hand. It may not come again soon. Both India and Pakistan should try and prepare for it.