THE Russia-Ukraine war crossed the 1000-day mark on November 19 and the conflict entered a higher level of fire-power escalation on November 17, when US President Joe Biden finally gave the authorisation for the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)…

C Uday Bhaskar

THE Russia-Ukraine war crossed the 1000-day mark on November 19 and the conflict entered a higher level of fire-power escalation on November 17, when US President Joe Biden finally gave the authorisation for the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) to be used by Ukraine.

While this decision is being interpreted as a case of Uncle Joe finally showing ‘spine’, albeit rather late in the day, the potential for sudden and dangerous escalation — either accidental or deliberate — has increased in a visible manner.

Kyiv had long sought such approval for the use of long-range western origin missiles, but this had been withheld by Washington as a measure of prudence and restraint to keep the conflict limited and confined to the two adversaries. It is pertinent that this green signal has been given when the Biden presidency is in what is described as its ‘lame-duck’ phase. This is the period after the US election results for the White House are announced (usually early November) and January 20, when the new incumbent assumes office — in this case, President-elect Donald Trump.

Kyiv lost no time in using its new weaponry and launched the ATACMS missiles against targets in Russia on November 20 and followed this offensive with the Storm Shadow missiles supplied by the UK. Earlier, Russia was accused of inducting North Korean troops into the conflict and also using drones supplied by Iran — thereby widening the scope of the war from a binary conflict (Russia-Ukraine) and according it a wider multinational nature. This has pitted Ukraine, supported by the US and some of its allies, against Russia, which is receiving tangible military assistance from North Korea and Iran.

Moscow retaliated almost immediately and on November 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his military had carried out an attack on the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipro, using “a new conventional intermediate-range missile.” Classified as Oreshnik, this has been identified as an experimental medium-range ballistic missile.

Putin stated: “In response to the use of American and British long-range weaponry, on 21 November this year, the Russian armed forces carried out a combined strike on one of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex sites.” The sub-text of the use of the hypersonic Oreshnik missile was that if the US-led alliance chose to escalate the lethality of the conflict, Russia would respond in an assertive manner. Putin added that Russia was “ready for any developments and if anyone still doubts this, they shouldn’t. There will always be a response.”

Will this response be nuclear? This is the worst-case scenario that many European nations fear and Putin has stoked this anxiety by revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine to cater to a wide range of exigencies that go beyond pristine deterrence.

Russia’s earlier nuclear doctrine was framed in the traditional template that was limited to the core mission, meaning that the nuclear weapon was meant only to ‘deter’ the adversary (the USA) from even contemplating the use of such apocalyptic capability. The second condition was to repel a conventional military attack that threatened the existence of the state.

However, the revised November doctrine announced by Moscow has expanded the spectrum and states that any attack by a non-nuclear power supported by a nuclear power would be considered a joint attack. It further adds that any attack by one member of a military bloc (in this case, the US-led alliance) would be considered an attack by the entire alliance.

Moscow has drawn attention to its nuclear capability since the early stage of this war that began in February 2022 and this has been repeated many times. However, the received wisdom is that Russia would not cross the red line and some western commentary has dismissed this as mere posturing. But such complacency may be misleading and dangerous.

It merits recall that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the USA and the former USSR that began in mid-October that year almost plunged the world into a nuclear war. This apocalyptic eyeball-to-eyeball brinkmanship was averted by the last-minute sagacity and prudence of the two leaders — US President John Kennedy and Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev. They decided to ‘blink’ together on November 20, 1962.

This resolute political decision at the summit level was taken despite the hawks in both nations urging escalation. The strategic restraint exercised by the captain of a Soviet submarine was fortuitous and the nuclear taboo was not violated.

Will such restraint be exercised in these volatile times?

By unveiling the Oreshnik, Russia has demonstrated an ordnance capability that is proximate to the nuclear weapon — but without atomic radiation. Russian media has reported that Oreshnik is a new generation of Russian intermediate-range missiles with a range of 2,500 km and could be extended to 5,000 km.

Hypersonic in nature, it has a speed between Mach 10 and Mach 11 (exceeding 12,000 km per hour) and is, hence, undetectable and the current anti-missile technology would not be able to intercept the missile. It was also highlighted that an Oreshnik launched from the Russian base at Kaliningrad would strike the following European capitals in a very short time span (all in seconds): Warsaw 81; Berlin 155; Paris 412; and London 416 seconds.

The escalatory dynamic in the Russia-Ukraine war that has gathered ominous traction since mid-November will test the acumen of the strategic and security establishment of the principal interlocutors. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted on October 3 that the danger of a direct armed clash between nuclear powers cannot be underestimated. “What is happening has no analogues in the past, we are moving through unexplored military and political territory.”

The Russia-Ukraine war has crossed the 1,000-day mark and is poised at a critical cusp. A civilian nuclear accident or deliberate military incident would both be catastrophic and the lame-duck phase in US governance should not be allowed to inadvertently abet either possibility. The Trump 2.0 presidency which follows will be disruptive and quixotic and 2025 could see more turbulence.