INS Arighaat and INS Arihant will enhance the robustness of India’s strategic posture.

C Uday Bhaskar

THE commissioning of India’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arighaat, on August 29 at Visakhapatnam is a significant step in India’s progression towards a credible second-strike deterrence capability.

The first SSBN (ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear), the INS Arihant, was commissioned in 2016. It became fully operational in 2018 and India carried out its first successful submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in 2022. The chronology is relevant to contextualise the arduous timelines, the complexity of achieving techno-strategic benchmarks and zero-error platform integration for an SSBN to become a credible platform in the deterrence calculus.

These two ‘boats’ — as submarines are referred to — will enhance the robustness of India’s strategic posture. India became a nuclear weapon power in May 1998 when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee boldly authorised the ‘Shakti’ tests and soon adopted a no-first-use (NFU) policy as its nuclear doctrine.

The efficacy of effective deterrence and the NFU policy is predicated on a credible second-strike capability, meaning that the nation must acquire the ability to first deter a potential adversary from embarking on an apocalyptic nuclear weapon path. This calls for prudent signalling regarding WMD (weapons of mass destruction) competence, as in the ability to deliver nuclear ordnance in an appropriate manner and the national resolve to take this ultimate step if deterrence fails.

To make deterrence more robust, the Cold War experience is instructive. The US used atomic weapons in Hiroshima-Nagasaki (1945) and the USSR soon joined the nuclear club. These two superpowers amassed WMD missiles in a frenzied manner and took the world to the brink of a nuclear war during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This scary experience compelled both nations to work towards stable deterrence models and this was arrived at by way of the techno-strategic options provided by a nuclear-propelled submarine carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles — the SSBN.

In summary, because of its intrinsic stealth features, a nuclear-propelled submarine can remain submerged for extended periods and is relatively undetectable. Hence, it is the ideal platform to carry the ‘second strike’ capability by way of long-range, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.

The core function of the SSBN is to ensure peace through deterrence — not to engage in sabre-rattling or war-fighting — and this was the essence of what Rajnath Singh highlighted at the Arighaat commissioning, when he noted that the SSBN would “establish strategic balance and peace in the region and play a decisive role in the country’s security”.

India began its nuclear-propelled submarine programme in 1984 when Vice-Admiral MK (Miki) Roy was appointed the first DG of what was then called the ATV (advanced technology vessel) project. This was a top-secret mission and then PM Indira Gandhi had accorded this project the appropriate degree of national priority and support.

India was placed under US-led technological sanctions after the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) and this was a period when Delhi could not import as much as a screwdriver! And for a country that lacked an advanced domestic industrial ecosystem and did not design and manufacture even a scooter or a car, India embarked upon what many critics thought was a leap of madness. It decided to design its own nuclear reactor and build its own submarine and — hold your breath — this would be an SSBN.

While all nations that acquired SSBNs before India (the US, former USSR, now Russia, the UK, France and China) first built conventional boats with diesel-electric propulsion, then moved up the ladder to design nuclear-propelled boats (SSN) and then, finally, mated the ballistic missile with nuclear warheads, thereby making the platform a potent SSBN. India plunged into the SSBN quest in the first instance, albeit with valuable help from Moscow. This was audacious.

The success of the Indian SSBN programme must be assessed against this geopolitical and techno-strategic framework and, hence, the long gestation from 1984 to 2024 for India to acquire its second SSBN. The technical characteristics of the Arighaat are similar to the Arihant: powered by an 83-MW pressurised light-water nuclear reactor and displacing 6,000 tonnes, the boat can attain a maximum speed of 12-15 knots (22-28 km/h) on the surface and up to 24 knots (44 km/h) when submerged. It is currently armed with missiles of 750 km and the boats are also designed to carry a longer range 3,500-km missile, the K-4.

Acquiring an appropriate level of nuclear deterrence that is effective, sustainable and affordable is an onerous responsibility for the higher defence management of the nation — the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) headed by the PM. This is even more so for India that is committed to the NFU policy and is located in a difficult strategic geography. The China-Pakistan-North Korea WMD proliferation triangle goes back to the 1980s. This opaque partnership can pose complex security challenges in this decade.

India’s entire nuclear capability, posture and long-term profile have to be reviewed periodically and necessary funding be made available. Acquiring more platforms and honing the efficacy of the first two boats so as to build on the currently modest SSBN capability is a first step.

The underwater domain will be a contested arena to maintain peace in the uneasy Indo-Pacific. Delhi will have to be proactive to be able to ‘deter’ potential nuclear adversaries without fear of escalation. The SSBN is the most effective option in the national quiver and India will have to be cognisant of this abiding imperative.

Acclaimed US nuclear theorist Thomas Schelling offered sage counsel to security planners: “An early strategist’s metaphor that nuclear planners are like homebuilders remains true today. A wise architect does not design only for benign environments, but for the worst weather conditions one can reasonably anticipate. We have to consistently maintain a ‘building code’ for our strategic forces to ensure they can weather the most stressing scenarios we can reasonably postulate.” Prudent advice for South Block.