Many ambitious Generals in Pakistan and Bangladesh have ended up conflating their individual identities with partisanship.

Lt Gen Retd Bhopinder Singh

MILITARIES of the Indian subcontinent have a common fount — the colonial British Indian Army. Before the raising of the official ‘Indian Army’ in 1895, the collective force of the British Raj was made up of three presidency armies — Bengal Army, Madras Army and the Bombay Army. Till date, the essential construct of the subcontinental militaries retains similar nomenclature, structuring, culture of regiments (reflecting societal/regional diversities) and institutional values that, on paper, make for an aligned purpose for the profession of arms.

The three major subcontinental countries — India, Pakistan and Bangladesh — are constitutional democracies, subscribing to the principle of civilian control of the military. However, the ideal level of civil control, defined by historian Samuel P Huntington as “the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority”, has varied dramatically among the three countries. The ability to keep the armed forces insulated and distanced from internal politics, partisanship or societal passion (e.g., religiosity, regionalism) has varied substantially. Wherever and whenever the militaries have sought a role beyond their constitutionally defined mandate of defending the borders or for tackling internal insurgencies (whenever the police forces have failed to contain them), progressive democracy has weakened.

Since Independence in 1947, the Pakistani military has taken over the formal reins of power during 1958-71, 1977-88, and 1999-2008. Even when the civilian rule ostensibly existed in Pakistan, it was the worst-kept secret that the Army House (residence of the army chief) in the garrison township of Rawalpindi — and not in the political capital of Islamabad — called the shots. The Pakistani Warrant of Precedence may put the army chief at Article (level) 11, but the ‘redlines’ on critical sovereign politics, positions and preferences are always defined by the Army House. Across the Line of Control, the Indian experiment in democracy persisted with virtually no role or relevance afforded to the world’s second-largest military force beyond its constitutional remit. The Indian tradition of maintaining the institution’s healthy ‘distance’ from politics and partisanship, has been the key, unlike in Pakistan.

Even the relatively younger nation of Bangladesh has had difficulties in restraining its ‘barracks’, with as many as 29 recorded coup attempts. The formal takeover by the military could be traced to the presidentship of Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem (1975-77), who took over in the aftermath of repeated counter-coups. He was made the Chief Martial Law Administrator in a junta-style cabinet presided by three chiefs of the armed forces. He was succeeded by Lt Gen Ziaur Rahman (1977-81) and, after a two-year gap, by Lt Gen Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983-90). The fact that the post-independence Bangladeshi military was composed of diverse elements from the Pakistani army, Mukti Bahini militia and other rebels from varied ideological moorings made the institution susceptible to irreconcilable affiliations that were in conflict with each other and banked on domestic politics to advance their agendas. Since the Bangladeshi military (like the Pakistanis) was unable to extricate itself from the societal morass and afflictions, it partook of extraconstitutional endeavours, and thus democracy suffered.

There were unscheduled regime changes in Pakistan (April 2022) and Bangladesh (August 2024), where the hand of the respective militaries was unmistakable. The Pakistani ‘establishment’ (read military) had forced out the vainglorious PM Imran Khan after ‘selecting’ him in 2018, as he had started fancying a bigger role for himself. Imran was soon cut to size and the political forces that were dumped by the ‘establishment’ earlier (PML-N and PPP) made a comeback as unnatural coalition partners. The ‘establishment’ made it clear that it was not bound by any partisan preference, but only by the institution’s self-interest and supremacy.

Meanwhile, it took Gen Waker-Uz-Zaman, who took charge as Bangladesh’s Chief of Army Staff as recently as June 23, to oust PM Sheikh Hasina, to whom he owed his elevation. He is married to the daughter of a former army chief, Gen Mustafizur Rahman, who was Hasina’s uncle and her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s cousin. But all of this came to nought as presumably Gen Waker-Uz-Zaman would have read the writing on the wall in terms of Hasina’s unpopularity and thought it prudent to back her rivals. Importantly, he had refused to honour Hasina’s orders to clamp down on protesters in violation of his sworn oath, irrespective of the merits/demerits of Hasina’s judgement. In many ways, he took a political punt.

In Pakistan, a one-time dashing and cavalier Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who occupied the important post of DG-ISI (Director General of the Inter-Services-Intelligence), is being targeted for the second time, after he was unceremoniously retired for displaying partisanship (favouring Imran) to the detriment of the ‘establishment’. Now, as the brinkmanship of the ‘establishment’ with Imran continues, a providential corruption case involving Lt Gen Hameed has resurfaced and he faces a disgraceful court martial. He may be the direct casualty, but the aim is to discredit his political master (Imran).

It is a twist of fate that besets so many ambitious Generals in Pakistan and Bangladesh, where they end up conflating their individual identities with partisanship while in uniform. India has been luckier to have a lot fewer with brazen political affiliations, as the proverbial cantonment gates historically remained closed. Regrettably, not only has the metaphorical access and expressions shown a disconcerting influx of partisan invocation in recent times, but politicians too have made dangerous appropriation of the institution to build their ‘muscular’ politics. A cursory glance at what awaits a nation when partisanship creeps into the barracks can be gauged by looking west or east, especially as both sides were part of a common force once. The Indian armed forces must remain proudly apolitical, ‘distanced’ and spared condescending usurpation which is essentially partisan in intent.