The Pashtuns hold the key to immediate peace as all Taliban belong to that ethnic race. With a possible security vacuum after the US withdrawal, ethnic affiliation on both sides of the Durand line and a landlocked Afghanistan’s dependence on it, Pakistan emerges as the most important external influencer.
Pullout: Biden’s decision to bring back troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, has a wide appeal domestically. Reuters
In the last quarter of 2009, the Barack Obama administration was considering modifying the US strategy in Afghanistan as there were contesting arguments on the question of whether a surge of troops should be attempted or not. Ultimately, General Stanley McChrystal, the overall military commander in the country, made a case that more troops were needed to fight the growing insurgency and make some social gains. This argument prevailed.
The US troops’ strength in Afghanistan increased to 98,000. Instead of counter-terrorism, a strategy of counter-insurgency, as was done in Iraq, was promoted with an aim to win over the hearts and minds of Afghan people. During his trip to Afghanistan in December, 2009, the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, reportedly noted that the US mistakenly abandoned Afghanistan in 1989 as it fought the Soviets and that he understood Afghans’ concerns that they would be left alone against the Taliban. He added he would try to assure President Karzai and his advisers “that we are not going to repeat the situation [of] 1989” and that “we intend to be their partner for a long time to come.”
On April 14, 2021, President Biden, who as Vice-President had opposed the troop surge, announced the end to the presence of US troops in Afghanistan on September 11, 2021. In practical terms, the decision is more symbolic as the US troops have already dwindled to 2,500, with the US allies contributing 9,500.
The then President Trump may have been reckless and undiplomatic, but his view on bringing troops back to the country was a reflection of the sentiment that existed across the US, particularly in mid-western and southern states where the bulk of military recruitment takes place. Even though many Republican senators have protested, Biden’s decision to bring back troops has a wider appeal domestically, though many assumptions about peace were and are still predicated on brittle foundations.
Biden has said: “We were attacked, we went to war with clear goals.” He added, “We achieved those objectives. Bin Laden is dead and al-Qaida is degraded in Afghanistan, and it’s time to end this forever war.”
The attack on Afghanistan led to the quick downfall of the Taliban as regime leaders and Bin Laden fled the urban centres. Ultimately, Bin Laden was killed in 2011 in Abbottabad, eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, nearly nine years after the Taliban rule was dislodged in Afghanistan. The Pothwari-speaking Abottabad is closer to Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir in ethnic and geographic terms and is far away from Afghanistan.
Secondly, al-Qaida and Taliban are different entities and it took time for this reality to sink in within the US security apparatus. Actually, it was Saudi-born Bin Laden’s transnational connections and deep pockets that enabled him to conspire to attack the US on September 9, 2001, and not al-Qaida’s mere presence in Afghanistan.https://7a64296af5e423b0a17593809ad440c5.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html
Moreover, the linkages of the Taliban — who are local Pashtuns — with Arab fighters, which became al-Qaida’s main ethnic base, were forged during the Afghan jihad sponsored by the US.
Pakistan, Russia, India, China and Turkey were the countries identified by Biden in his televised address, which, according to him, should play their part in bringing peace in Afghanistan. At a practical level, China is not yet a player in Afghanistan and has generally been reluctant to expend resources in the complicated landscape of Afghanistan. Russian influence in Afghanistan is mainly on account of Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which share ethnic ties with the Uzbeks and Tajiks, ethnic groups living in the peripheral areas of Afghanistan.
The mention of Turkey, not an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan with limited historical ties, seems to be a way to undercut the potential influence of Saudis over Afghanistan that had fueled the rise of extremist Islam. In addition to US and Saudi money helping support the war against Soviets in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia infused Deobandi seminaries with the Wahhabi ideology.
There is hardly any doubt that the Pashtuns are the ones that hold the key to immediate peace as all Taliban belong to that ethnic race. With a possible security vacuum after the US withdrawal, strong ethnic affiliation on both sides of the Durand line and a landlocked Afghanistan’s dependence on its eastern neighbour, Pakistan emerges as the most important external influencer. It will both shape as well feel the impact of Afghanistan’s future.https://7a64296af5e423b0a17593809ad440c5.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html
Pakistan’s own disjointed institutional approach toward Islamic extremism, its vulnerabilities in its own Pashtun heartland and suspicion over India’s role in Afghanistan are some of the vectors that may influence this complex relationship. Iran could provide alternative seaport access to Afghanistan for trade. Biden didn’t mention Iran because of the animus-ridden US-Iran ties.
India has its limitations — because of no direct land route — as well as strengths. One of the lesser known facts is the Pashtuns’ ties with India’s Deobandi Islamic School which was founded in the latter half of the 19th century. The bifurcation of British India in 1947 severed the institutional links between Deobandi seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in India. Pashtuns played a big role in the Afghan jihad, and a large number of these fighters were drawn from the Deobandi seminaries.
Going forward, India, by promoting ties between Deobands and Pashtuns in Afghans, may help to moderate the Deobandi Islam as practised in Afghanistan. This approach could help the Pashtuns to have a more contextual interpretation of various religious edicts and promote debate, engagement and coexistence with the non-Pashtun Muslims. This could also help in supporting efforts in the direction of national conciliation among the diverse array of ethnic and sectarian groups in the country.
Biden’s announcement reflects a sobering reality that the exercise of state/nation-building, even with a vast corpus of external resources and backed by the strongest military the human history has seen, has its limits.
Biden and the American policy elite have reconciled to the fact that Afghanistan’s internal social realities and geography would shape its future, for good or bad.