Monthly Archives: August 2018

In July, Air Chief Marshal Singh had said “atmanirbharta (self-reliance) cannot be at the cost of the nation’s defence”, speaking out at a time the Centre is pushing its Make in India policy in the defence sector

New Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Air Marshal Amar Preet Singh, right, with outgoing CAS Air Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari during handing over of the command at Air headquarters, in New Delhi, Monday, Sept. 30, 2024.

ir Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh on Monday took charge as the chief of the Indian Air Force (IAF), succeeding incumbent Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari.

Before assuming the charge, Singh was the vice-chief of the Air Staff.

In July, Air Chief Marshal Singh had said “atmanirbharta (self-reliance) cannot be at the cost of the nation’s defence”, speaking out at a time the Centre is pushing its Make in India policy in the defence sector.

He had underscored the fact that he fully supported the drive towards self-reliance in defence, but flagged the deficiencies in domestic defence manufacturing and said “Atma Nirbhar Bharat should not just be a buzzword”.

Born on October 27, 1964, Singh was commissioned into the fighter pilot stream of the IAF in 1984. During a service spanning nearly 40 years, he has served in several command, staff, instructional and foreign appointments.

An alumnus of the National Defence Academy, Defence Services Staff College and National Defence College, Singh is a qualified flying instructor and an experimental test pilot with more than 5,000 hours of flying experience on several fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.

He has also commanded an operational fighter squadron and a frontline air base.

Sources in the IAF said Singh’s top priority would be strengthening the IAF’s fighting capability.

The IAF faces a shortageof fighter aircraft amid a delay in the delivery of the indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft, being made byHindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL).

Around 65 to 70 per cent of the IAF’s fighter aircraft are Russian, and most of them either need urgent upgrades or are on the verge of retirement. Having foreign aircraft also means staying dependent on other countries for parts and components.

Against an authorised strength of 42 fighter squadrons, the IAF currently has 31. Each squadron has an average of 18 aircraft, which means the IAF has 558 fighters, 198 short of the required 756.

Recently, the IAF had flagged its concern over the slow pace of the Tejas light combat aircraft programme by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, saying a delayed induction could affect the force’s combat effectiveness.

Indian Air Force vice chief Air Marshal AP Singh on Friday said “atmanirbharta” (self-reliance) in the defence manufacturing sector can’t be at the cost of the country’s security, while highlighting the critical role of the domestic industry in accomplishing the self-reliance goals so that the military doesn’t have to look for weapons and systems elsewhere to stay battle read

Indian Air Force vice chief Air Marshal AP Singh on Friday said “atmanirbharta” (self-reliance) in the defence manufacturing sector can’t be at the cost of the country’s security, while highlighting the critical role of the domestic industry in accomplishing the self-reliance goals so that the military doesn’t have to look for weapons and systems elsewhere to stay battle ready.

He said that there could be compulsions to deviate from the self-reliance path to strengthen key capabilities, even as he drew attention towards the speed at which India’s adversaries are building military capabilities.

“Atmanirbharta is what we are riding. But this atmanirbharta cannot be at the cost of nation’s defence,” Singh said at a seminar.

“The nation’s defence comes first and foremost, and if IAF or Indian forces have to ride on atmanirbharta, it is only possible if everyone, from DRDO to DPSUs to the private industry, holds our hand and takes us on that path and doesn’t let us deviate. Because when it comes to national defence, there will be compulsions to deviate from that path in case we do not get the things we need, or the kind of systems and weaponry required to survive in today’s world.”

India is pursuing an ambition agenda to achieve self-reliance in the defence sector with the support of the three services.

It has taken a raft of measures during the last five to six years to boost self-reliance in the defence manufacturing sector. Apart from a series of phased import bans, these steps include creating a separate budget for buying locally made military hardware, increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) from 49% to 74% and improving ease of doing business.

“The rate at which our adversaries are building their numbers while imbibing new technologies, the capability gap is continuously growing. I exhort DRDO, DPSUs and the private industry to focus on innovative technologies, out-of-the-box solutions and increase of capability as well as capacity,” he said.

Referring to the ongoing global conflicts, he said If geopolitics has a lesson, it is to be self-reliant. “Atmanirbhar Bharat should not just be a buzzword, it should be our overriding concern and pursued holistically in letter and spirit.”

The IAF vice chief has made a valid point, said Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), former director general, Centre of Air Power Studies.

“Self-reliance can’t be at the cost of reduced military capability. The military’ job is to defend the country, and at any given time, it must have the adequate strength for that. If the development of our military platforms is lagging, interim solutions will have to be found…even if it means resorting to imports,” Chopra added.

Singh called for putting in place a system for collaborative efforts towards achieving the country’s overall goals. “If we have to defend the nation, it is everybody’s job. It is not just the job of a person in uniform.”

“Technological advancements continue to surprise us with their rapid pace. What was unimaginable just a few years ago is now a reality. The impact of technology infusion into warfighting has made it crystal clear that we in the armed forces need to be more agile and flexible in both thoughts and actions,” Singh said.

To be sure, India recently announced that it had recorded the highest ever growth in the value of local defence production in the financial year 2023-24 on the back of enabling policy measures, with the figure reaching almost ₹1.27 lakh crore, a development hailed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Of the total value of production in 2023-24, 79.2% was contributed by DPSUs and other PSUs, and the remaining 20.8% by the private sector.

The value of defence production is around 17% higher than in the previous financial year.

Also, defence exports touched a record-high of ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24, reflecting a growth of 32.5% over the last fiscal when the figure was ₹15,920 crore.

Amid border talks, Beijing showcases military muscle in a clear warning to New Delhi

China has flexed its military muscle with surface-to-air missile tests on the Karakoram Plateau, near the border with India. The tests took place even as diplomatic talks between India and China were ongoing, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported.

The test involved intercepting for the first time a subsonic cruise missile at slightly over 17,390ft. The test served as a demonstration of military prowess to show that China could bring down in harsh conditions the best missiles that India might have in its arsenal.

“The specific location of the test was not disclosed….but analysts say its proximity to the border suggested it was part of a deterrence strategy,” the SCMP said in its report.

China’s state media reported the missile intercept test on the same day that China and India held their 31st meeting on border affairs in Beijing, during which they agreed to strengthen dialogue and maintain peace along their border.

The SCMP quoted one Chinese analyst who said that China has been carrying out such weapons tests on the border plateau region ever since the 2020 Galwan clashes and border troubles with India.

“It carries a certain deterrent message. To avoid war, we must first possess the capability to fight,” Lin Minwang, deputy director, Fudan University’s Centre for South Asian Studies, told the SCMP.

Significantly, Minwang insisted that, “It is impossible for China to meet India’s demands,” even though he maintained that “both sides are intensifying efforts to reach an agreement on border issues as soon as possible.”

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Minwang also issued a warning, saying that, “The test signifies to India that China possesses military capabilities… and the choice now lies with India.”

Another Chinese military commentator, Song Zhongping, described the tests as a clear warning to India, calling the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) test a “guarantee of strength” to back China’s position in the talks.

Zhongping elaborated without mincing his words: “The goal was to intercept all incoming targets, whether they are subsonic or hypersonic [missiles]. Negotiations without that guarantee of strength are unlikely to produce results.”

Both sides have been issuing mixed statements about talks during the last few weeks. Zhang Xiaogang, a spokesman in the ministry of national defence, said late last week that India and China have been “able to reduce their differences and build some consensus besides agreeing to strengthen dialogue”.

However, there has been no indication whether China would allow the Indian Army to resume patrolling in areas like the Depsang Plains and Demchok where it had regularly patrolled until a few years ago.

The timing of the test amid ongoing dialogues between the two sides could prompt India to reassess its defence priorities and seek to build a more robust deterrent force including hypersonic missiles and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, regional analysts said.

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar struck an optimistic note in early September when he said in Geneva there was 75 per cent progress on the “disengagement” issues between the two countries relating to the disengagement of troops in Eastern Ladakh.

Jaishankar met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in July in Laos while attending ASEAN meetings. National security adviser Ajit Doval met the Chinese foreign minister in St Petersburg in early September. Both Doval and Wang are the special representatives for the India-China talks mechanism.

At the St Petersburg meeting, India’s foreign ministry said India and China had agreed to work with “urgency” and “redouble” their efforts to achieve complete disengagement in the remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh.

Wang stressed at the talks that “facing a turbulent world, China and India as two ancient eastern civilisations” should “choose unity and cooperation, and avoid consuming each other,” China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

India insists that its ties with China cannot be normal unless there’s peace in the border areas. In the meantime, China has continued to strengthen its airfields and heliports in Ladakh and Tibet, enabling them to move troops to forward areas swiftly.

The J&K Police have appointed an Army officer as the Senior Superintendent of Police (Training and Special Operations) in the Union Territory. At present, the Army officer, Colonel Vikrant Prasher from Para, was posted with the Army’s High Altitude Warfare…

The J&K Police have appointed an Army officer as the Senior Superintendent of Police (Training and Special Operations) in the Union Territory.

At present, the Army officer, Colonel Vikrant Prasher from Para, was posted with the Army’s High Altitude Warfare School in Gulmarg, Kashmir. The Army officer will serve J&K for a period of two years on a deputation basis.

Indian Army’s High Altitude Warfare School located at Gulmarg is specialised in high and super-high altitude warfare training. On Friday, the JK Home Department issued the order, appointing him as the SSP (Training and Special Operations), with “immediate effect.”

This is for the first time in the recent past that a serving Army officer has been deputed to the J&K police, which has been at the forefront of anti-militancy operations.

Meanwhile, former CM and PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti wrote on X, “We are told that J&K has the same rights and rules as applied elsewhere in the country. Wonder why & under what special status is the local administration ordering the most unusual appointment of a Colonel as the SSP in the J&K police?”

No LAC trade-off should be acceptable to India

Editorial

THE irony is not lost on anyone: Chinese negotiators have suggested to India that their troops be allowed to patrol in two sensitive areas along Arunachal Pradesh, even as Chinese soldiers have denied Indian troops access to four patrolling points in eastern Ladakh over the past four years. The Arunachal spots — including one in the Yangtse area north-east of Tawang, where the two sides had clashed in December 2022 — have been under Indian control for decades. Delhi knows very well that if you give Beijing an inch, it will end up taking a mile. The unreasonable demand speaks volumes about China’s dubious intentions. No trade-off or quid pro quo of any sort should be acceptable to India.

Trust deficit continues to define the India-China relationship in the wake of the Galwan clash, even though the two countries have held 21 rounds of Corps Commander-level talks regarding the LAC dispute in eastern Ladakh since June 2020. There have also been 31 meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. Despite the all-out emphasis on dialogue and communication, disengagement at the friction points of Demchok and Depsang has remained elusive.

The fact that the Chinese have made a demand this time rather than going ahead with a brazen incursion should not lull Delhi into believing that the Dragon has mellowed. India must hold its ground to counter attempts by the People’s Liberation Army troops to change the status quo in Arunachal. Beijing’s sharp reaction to the naming of an Arunachal peak after the 6th Dalai Lama by an Indian mountaineering team has again laid bare its territorial overreach. Chinese temerity stems partly from a dominant position on the trade front — India seems helpless in reducing its heavy dependence on imports from its northern neighbour. The double challenge for India is to stand up to China — militarily as well as economically.

Fifty-six years after an Indian Air Force plane crashed north of the 13,000-ft-high Rohtang Pass, a team of mountaineers has found four bodies of soldiers who died in that crash. The mission, led by the Dogra Scouts of Indian Army…

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

Fifty-six years after an Indian Air Force plane crashed north of the 13,000-ft-high Rohtang Pass, a team of mountaineers has found four bodies of soldiers who died in that crash.

The mission, led by the Dogra Scouts of Indian Army in collaboration with representatives of Tiranga Mountain Rescue, is part of the larger Chandra Bhaga Mountain Expedition. The joint team recovered the remains of four more individuals from the site, marking a significant success in one of India’s longest-running search and recovery operation.

The search is part of the ‘Chandra Bhaga Expedition’ that is on from September 25 to October 10.

An IAF AN-12 aircraft, which took off from Chandigarh on February 7, 1968, with 102 passengers, went missing near the Rohtang Pass, north of Manali in Himachal Pradesh. For decades, the wreckage and remains of the victims remained lost in the icy terrain. It was only in 2003 when mountaineers from the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Mountaineering discovered the wreckage.

Over the years, expeditions were launched by the Indian Army, led by Dogra Scouts in 2005, 2006, 2013, and 2019. In the past expeditions, only five bodies were recovered till 2019. Official sources said mountaineers have now found three fully intact bodies and remains of a fourth one from the mountains.

Among the bodies found are those of Malkhan Singh, Sepoy Narayan Singh and craftsman Thomas Charan. Malkhan was identified by a voucher found in his pocket. His identity was confirmed with the help of documents obtained from Pioneer Records Office.

Narayan Singh, a sepoy from the Army Medical Corps, was identified by his paybook found on his person. Singh hailed from Kolpadi village, Chamoli tehsil in Garhwal, Uttarakhand. The body of craftsman Thomas Charan was confirmed through his paybook. He hailed from Elanthoor in Kerala.

By turning a blind eye to the collusion of the armed groups with Arambai Tenggol and the state police in attacking the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages, the CM and his Security Adviser have lost their credibility.

Kham Khan Suan Hausing

IN an unusual display of cooperation and coordination between the Manipur Chief Minister’s Office and its Security Adviser, who is also the head of the Unified Security Command of the state, the former sent an intelligence ‘input’ to the latter and two high-ranking officials of the state on September 16, 2024. The ‘input’ forewarned a veritable doomsday for the Meitei community. It said ‘over 900 Kuki militants’ who reportedly infiltrated into Manipur were set to ‘launch multiple coordinated attacks on Meitei villages around 28 September.’

To amplify the ‘threat’ perception, this ‘input’, signed by N Geoffrey, Secretary to the CM, was framed in the language of ‘national security threat’ best understood by policy mandarins in New Delhi. It was remarkably pointed and precise in its details. It stated that these militants ‘newly trained in use of drone-based bombs, projectiles, missiles and jungle warfare [are] grouped in units of 30 members each….’

Coming within a fortnight of the unverified and sensational claim by CM Biren Singh and the state police that the Kuki militants used sophisticated drone bombs and rocket-propelled guns (RPGs) to attack Meitei settlements in Koutruk village and Bishnupur just across the ‘buffer zone’, this intelligence input whipped up a communal frenzy and brought full circle the hyperbole debate on ‘threats’ to India’s national security.

The blanket vilification and selective targeting of the Kukis as ‘terrorists’ and as the singular source of ‘threat’ to national security could not have come into sharper relief.

A deeper probe into the immediate context, however, suggests that the CM was desperately in need of a sensational news item to deflect increasing public scrutiny on his integrity in light of two of his recent outlandish claims: firstly, his alleged self-incriminating claim in a leaked tape — run by an online news portal in August 2024 — that he advocated the secret use of ‘bombs’ and violence against the Kukis to protect Meitei identity and dignity; and secondly, his claim that the Kukis used drone bombs and RPGs to attack Meitei settlements was contested by, among others, Lt-Gen PC Nair, former Director-General of Assam Rifles, on the grounds that they were not corroborated by the Indian Army and by ‘substantive evidences’ on the ground.

Seen against this backdrop, the intelligence input was far from being a genuine concern for ‘national security’. It was driven by a self-goal to salvage the CM’s dented image on the one hand and a convenient scapegoat to launch a series of ‘combing operations’ to pre-emptively strike the Kuki ‘militants’ on the other hand. This point is alluded to by Kuldiep Singh, the Security Adviser, during his press brief on September 20.

What is, however, baffling is the manner in which Kuldiep Singh pliantly submitted to and cooperated with this intelligence bluster. Without bothering to establish its credibility, he affirmed that the ‘input’ was ‘100 per cent correct’ until proven otherwise. This also suggests that the de facto lever of security control in the state has always been wielded by the CM. Interestingly, the CM’s longstanding grievance is that he has been rendered powerless after being substituted by Kuldiep Singh as the head of the Unified Security Command in May last year.

That neither Kuldiep Singh nor the high-ranking military and police officials who attended the security group meeting, which was convened by Singh two days after he received this input, ever bothered to establish its credibility is a telling commentary on the tenuous civil-military relations in the state. A premeditated misinformation campaign such as this is unlikely to yield sub-optimal ‘national security’ outcomes.

In game theory, overcoming collective action problem and obtaining optimal outcomes demand that players coordinate under a rule-based institutionalised framework where information inputs are credible, transparent and not distorted.

Security protocol also demands that ‘immediate’ and ‘secret’ information of such kind be put under meticulous scrutiny and not be shared with the public before credible and actionable strategies are chalked out and potential threats neutralised.

The Spear Corps plausibly kept this in mind when it demanded details and proper scrutiny of the intelligence ‘input’ in its tweet immediately after the Security Adviser briefed the media.

However, in an insurgent space where the powers-that-be have for long operated with impunity under the shadow of a compromised institutional ecosystem and where they expect pliant actors to fall in line, any contrarian position is not tolerated. This explains why the Spear Corps’ tweet was immediately taken down.

Had the CMO’s concern been genuine, the large-scale ‘infiltration’ of proscribed Meitei armed organisations into the valley areas from Myanmar and their involvement in perpetrating violence against the tribal Kuki-Zomi-Hmar communities would have merited attention and coordinated response of the political and security establishments by now.

By turning a blind eye to the reported involvement and collusion of the armed groups like the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Kanglei Yawol Kanba Lup (KYKL) with Arambai Tenggol and the state police in attacking the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages across the ‘buffer zones’, the CM and his Security Adviser have lost their credibility. They have also compromised their constitutional oath and commitments and made their positions untenable.

This selective amnesia implies that the ‘national security’ gains obtained by the security forces in the aftermath of ‘Operation All Clear’ in 2004 — which flushed out proscribed Meitei armed organisations from Sajik Tampak and the valley areas — have been neutralised under the nose of the current political dispensation.

Genuine commitment to national security interest will also be equally mindful of the unrivalled access that the UNLF and other Meitei proscribed armed militants have to sophisticated weapons and armoury within and across the Indo-Myanmar border.

This point is underscored by the UNLF’s extensive use of IEDs in Pherzawl district in 2005-06 where many tribals were trapped and killed.

Another instance highlights the same point: the People Liberation Army (PLA), another proscribed Meitei armed group, ambushed with ease the Assam Rifles convoy in November 2021 just a couple of kilometres away from the Indo-Myanmar border. They killed with impunity five Assam Rifles’ personnel, Col Viplav Tripathy, his wife and son. It shows that the source of national security threat lies somewhere else across the Indo-Myanmar border.

The recovery of a large cache of ‘arms and ammunition with war-like stores’ from 12 KYKL cadres apprehended by the Spear Corps at Itham village in East Imphal district on June 24, 2023 demonstrated beyond doubt the real source of danger to India’s national security.

As the ‘doomsday’ forecast passed off as a mere ‘bluster’ and Manipur’s CM’s office got away with this unacceptable misinformation campaign, the verdict was on the Indian state and its democratic culture of impunity.

It is about time the Indian state priorities its national security focus and fixes political accountability. Instead of spending over Rs 31,000 crore on a clichéd idea which seeks to erect border fencing along selected pockets of the over 1,600-km Indo-Myanmar border, it should invest in modernising the intelligence network and upskilling the security forces. Lest Colonel Tripathy and other valiant soldiers who laid down their lives should never forgive us for allowing populist leaders in Manipur and beyond to get away with their misplaced national security priorities.

The importance of Aatmanirbharta is magnified in domains impacting national security

Lt Gen DS Hooda retd.

ON September 17, hundreds of pagers used by Hezbollah members exploded nearly simultaneously across various locations in Lebanon and Syria, killing at least 12 people, including two children, and injuring at least 2,000. A second wave of attacks followed when dozens of two-way radios blew up, killing at least 20 people and wounding more than 450.

The modification of hardware & software to gather intelligence or sabotage critical infrastructure is not a new phenomenon.

Many believe that Israeli intelligence, particularly Unit 8200 — Israel’s cyber warfare division — masterminded the attacks. The motive appears clear: to paralyse Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure and instil widespread fear. Wary of mobile phone vulnerabilities, Hezbollah had recently shifted to using pagers as their primary means of communication.

According to reports, a small amount of explosives hidden in the pagers was triggered by a remote signal. The procurement chain of the pagers traces back to a Taiwanese company, Gold Apollo, which initially manufactured the AR-924 model pagers. However, the Hezbollah pagers were not directly sold by Gold Apollo but distributed by BAC Consulting, a Budapest-based company that held a licensing agreement with Gold Apollo. The New York Times reported that Israeli intelligence operated BAC Consulting and had created two unnamed shell corporations to obscure its involvement.Headlines following the attack have talked of terrifying implications for the future, a new chapter in cyber warfare and the weaponisation of everyday objects. While the Israeli attack was brilliantly planned and executed, its success should not surprise anyone familiar with state-sponsored cyber espionage. The modification of both hardware and software to gather intelligence or sabotage critical infrastructure is not a new phenomenon.

Edward Snowden revealed in June 2013 the existence of the PRISM programme, under which the US National Security Agency (NSA) collected data from Internet communications. The programme’s scale was staggering and included planting backdoors and spyware in electronic devices. According to a report in Der Spiegel, the NSA had planted backdoors to access computers, hard drives, routers and other devices from companies such as Cisco, Dell, Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor, Samsung and Huawei.

More NSA documents, released in Glenn Greenwald’s book No Place to Hide, detailed a specific instance of how NSA employees intercepted Cisco routers intended for organisations targeted for surveillance and implanted them with backdoors before shipping them on. Cisco publicly distanced itself from these actions, but the incident raised concerns about the vulnerability of global supply chains for tech hardware.

America is one of many countries that use these practices. A 2018 Bloomberg report alleged that Chinese intelligence agents had placed tiny microchips on server motherboards manufactured by Supermicro. These servers were sold to major US tech companies, including Amazon and Apple. The chips allegedly allowed for remote backdoor access.

In 2020, The Wall Street Journal quoted US officials as saying that Huawei was covertly accessing mobile networks via backdoors meant for law enforcement use, prompting several nations to ban the company’s products. Similarly, Chinese surveillance equipment makers Hikvision and Dahua have been blacklisted over concerns of sending sensitive data back to Beijing.

Despite the Snowden revelations of 2013, those responsible for cybersecurity in India were slow to react. Foreign hardware and software continued to be procured for critical military and civilian communication networks. It wasn’t until 2020, after the Chinese incursions in Ladakh, that the Indian government restricted Chinese telecom equipment. Yet, by then, more than half of the state-owned BSNL’s mobile network was based on equipment from ZTE and Huawei. Private telecom operators like Airtel and Vodafone also remain heavily dependent on Chinese equipment. In March 2021, Bharti Airtel awarded a telecom infrastructure expansion contract worth around Rs 300 crore to Huawei.

Efforts to reduce dependency on China and promote indigenisation have not yielded adequate results. As per a report by the Global Trade Research Initiative, China and Hong Kong accounted for an overwhelming 56 per cent of India’s total imports in electronics, telecom and electrical products in the 2023-24 financial year.

In July 2022, the Department of Telecom banned the use of non-trusted telecom gear for the expansion of communication networks in the country. However, this alone cannot prevent the poisoning of supply chains. Cisco, which has a significant presence in India, including in military communication networks, has received approval as a ‘trusted source’. According to data provided by the Voice of Indian Communication Technology Enterprises (VoICE), Cisco is the largest importer of equipment such as access points and switches from China.

The Indian Army recently adopted a secure mobile ecosystem called SAMBHAV (Secure Army Mobile Bharat Vision). However, the system does not address the fundamental vulnerability as it is based on a foreign handset and rides on commercial networks seeded with foreign equipment. It could end up providing a false sense of security.

It is well understood that foreign dependencies cannot be eradicated overnight, but there is a visible lack of a national strategy to work in this direction. We have been hearing about a new cybersecurity strategy since 2020, but it is yet to be promulgated. One essential element of this strategy must be replacing foreign hardware and software in critical systems.

In 2019, the US enacted the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, which mandates that US network operators remove network equipment from Chinese vendors Huawei and ZTE. This initiative, often referred to as the ‘rip and replace’ programme, provides federal funding to network operators. The fact that the programme is facing delays shows the depth of Chinese gear in the networks, but the US intent and direction are clear.

Mirroring the US move, the Chinese government recently ordered ‘rip and replace’ for US-made chips in its telecommunication networks by 2027. This follows a 2023 order banning government agencies from using iPhones and foreign-branded smartphones for work.

Aatmanirbharta is not just a goal; it is a strategic imperative. Its importance is magnified in domains directly impacting national security, where dependency is a vulnerability. One such domain is cybersecurity, where safeguarding the nation from state-sponsored cyber threats must be a top priority. We must fortify our digital defences, enhance indigenous capabilities and eliminate reliance on foreign technology that could be weaponised against us.