There has been confusion and hesitation in taking the CDS concept forward by adopting the add-on of integrated theatre commands.
Lt Gen (retd) Harwant Singh
THE proposal for adopting the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system was first floated by Lord Mountbatten, then Governor General of India. He had firsthand experience in leading a unified command (Army, Navy and Air Force) during World War II. But his proposal was given the cold shoulder by then PM Jawaharlal Nehru. Mountbatten then left it to Lord Ismay to resolve this issue. He faced opposition from both the PM and then Defence Minister Krishna Menon.
Later, when Nehru stayed at Mountbatten’s residence (in Broadlands, UK), he was warned by the latter of possible Chinese aggression and the prospect of India’s quick defeat. Mountbatten urged Nehru to appoint Gen KS Thimayya as the CDS and form integrated theatre commands (ITCs). But Nehru responded by saying that there was no question of a war, as India wished to be at peace with everybody.
This neglect of national security and the non-adoption of an appropriate defence policy and command structure have been India’s bane through the ages. From Alexander’s invasion of India to the Battle of Plassey, a fuzzy, ponderous and pedestrian system of higher defence organisations, as articulated by historian Jadunath Sarkar, runs like a warp thread in the management and conduct of India’s battles. Even during the battles fought by India after Independence, complete integration between the Army and the Air Force has been missing.
During the 1962 war against China, the Indian Air Force (IAF) stayed out, yet the then Indian Prime Minister wrote two letters to the US President, seeking fighter aircraft support for the Indian Army. As regards coordination between the Army and the Air Force during the 1965 war with Pakistan, Air Vice Marshal KL Sondhi’s assessment of the IAF’s performance (as recorded in Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh’s book, War Despatches) goes thus: “This also exemplified the IAF’s own half-hearted participation before the desperate reaction of Pakistan’s air force, which led to an air war — but the IAF missed a rare opportunity to demonstrate more fully to the Indian Army that it exists otherwise than a fighting service for its own good.”
Unfortunately, the core and kernel of the CDS system in its full spectrum have been missing from the IAF’s perception as well as that of some defence experts. Germany’s spectacular victories and rapid advances across Europe and the USSR during World War II were the result of a close integration of mechanised forces and the Luftwaffe. What most miss out is that war is akin to an orchestra, where, on one part, all musical instruments are played, conforming to the same tune, and, on the other, there has to be only one conductor. Similarly, all elements taking part in military operations have to focus on the same objective, with one overall commander, in line with the principle of war called ‘unity of command’.
Somehow, the IAF appears to be missing out on the adoption of the concept of ITCs and the principle of ‘unity of command’. Its imperatives seem to skip the Air Force’s grasp and thinking. Here, it would be appropriate to quote Gen Albrecht von Wallenstein: “Never will I accept divided command, even were God Himself to be my colleague in office. I command alone or not at all.” This is the essence of unity of command. Equally, with the adoption of the CDS system in totality, the three service chiefs are left with only staff functions and no operational role. Hence, they have given the proposal short shrift.
Since the time Mountbatten’s proposal was turned down by Nehru, India has simply overlooked the importance of integrating the potential of its three services, the very concept of the CDS system and the need to adopt it in its full spectrum. After the 1999 Kargil conflict, two panels were constituted — the K Subrahmanyam Committee and the Arun Singh Committee. In my presentation to the latter, it was recommended that two ITCs — Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) and Northern — be created and an Air Force officer could be the first commander of the Northern ITC to allay any apprehension on the part of the IAF. The remaining ITCs could be formed in stages. It was recommended that one Mountain Corps be raised for the Northern Theatre Command. While the A&N ITC came through, the remaining recommendations were put away. Little effort has been made since then to adopt the CDS system.
India did appoint a CDS. But since then, there has been confusion and hesitation in taking this concept forward by adopting the add-on of ITCs. The first CDS muddied the waters by projecting the Air Force as a supporting arm and expressing that the Indian Navy required submarines rather than aircraft carriers as opposed to the Navy’s own considered priority for aircraft carriers.
At present, there are six commands of the Army and five of the IAF that have a role in ground operations. The Navy has two commands for the Indian Ocean Region and one ITC for the A&N islands. Considering the extent of India’s land borders and coastline, an out-of-the-box solution is a must to cope with the complexity of the national security paradigm. To do away with the existing commands and create three or four ITCs would lead to considerable disruption in the rank structure of the three services. Therefore, there is a need to work out an organisation that results in minimum disruption in the existing structures and yet brings about integration of two or more components of defence services in a theatre, as required. That can be made possible by letting the existing commands remain as they are and grouping two or more under an ITC. Under this arrangement, integration between two or more services would be brought about by the theatre commander concerned. Each theatre command would have two Chiefs of Staff, one from each of the two components of the ITC.
The five workable ITCs would be: one consisting of the South Western Command, Western Command and Western Air Command; Northern Command and Northern Air Force Command; Central and Eastern Commands and Central and Eastern Air Commands; Southern Command and Southern Air Command; and the fifth comprising the two Naval commands and the A&N Command.
The overall war strategy would be worked out by the CDS within the framework of the national policy and the ITCs tasked accordingly.
Given the nature and extent of India’s security threats and the existing state of coordination between the three services, there is little time to lose in allowing the CDS system full play and integrating the full fighting potential of the three services.
