Current Events :
Written by Man Aman Singh Chhina
Former Army Chief General VN Sharma (retd) has made a startling revelation that the Military Operations Directorate had advised the then Army Chief General AS Vaidya that the Indian Army should not get involved in any operation to flush out Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his supporters from the Golden Temple as it was a political move.
General VN Sharma has made this statement in the course of an interview to a former Judge Advocate General of the Army, Maj Gen Nilendra Kumar, on a YouTube channel-Lex Consilium Foundation. The interview was uploaded on the channel on June 5, a day ahead of the 41st anniversary of Operation Blue Star and has generated considerable number of views and comments.
The 95-year-old General VN Sharma was serving as Additional Director General Military Operations (ADGMO) in the Military Operations (MO) directorate at the time Op Blue Star was launched. Lt Gen CN Somanna was the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) at the time while Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) VK Nayar was the other Additional Director General Military Operations in the directorate. Both, Somanna and Nayar have passed away many years back.
Gen Sharma says in the interview that the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wanted the Army to carry out the operation inside Golden Temple because the Punjab Police had refused to do so. “Arun Vaidya was called to the Prime Minister’s Office and was told that Bhindranwale had to be removed because he was getting too big for his boots, he doesn’t listen to anyone so take the Army in. General Vaidya said okay,” Gen Sharma recalls.https://d-19446906092031984310.ampproject.net/2505300108000/frame.html
He says the Army Chief then arrived at the MO directorate and spoke to the DGMO and the two ADGMOs regarding the task to be done. “We suggested to him that this was not a correct employment of the Indian Army. We explained that according to the Constitution the Indian Army cannot be used for political purposes by any government,” said Gen Sharma.
He goes on to say that the then PM wanted the Army to do the task because the police had refused. “So we told General Vaidya that it was not politically expedient because we cannot use the military for political purposes. She did a political stunt to put Bhindranwale there and now she was doing another political stunt to remove him by force using the Army since the police has refused,” says General Sharma in the interview. General Sharma goes on to say that the Army Chief General Vaidya was told my the three senior-most MO directorate officers that some other force like BSF, CRPF should be used and the Army should not intervene.
“He said she is the boss and when the boss says to jump you have to jump. We said no. You are a constitutional authority, the Army Chief, you have to ensure that the constitution is not violated. One option is to go to the Supreme Court and ask them as to whether this is legal or not legal. He said what do you expect me to do. We suggested that he go to her and tell her that it is not Army’s job,” said General Sharma.
The former Army Chief then goes on to say that General Vaidya went back to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and told her the view of the MO Directorate. He said that the PM then decided to approach the Western Army Commander Lt Gen K Sundarji directly in order to get the operation conducted since the Chief was reluctant.
“Vaidya’s office told Sundarji to go meet the Prime Minister. He (Vaidya) came back to the MO directorate and told this has happened. We said sir ‘maaf karo’ you have no business to allow an Army Commander to go directly to the Prime Minister,” he said.
General Sharma said the MO directorate was in touch with the staff of the Prime Minister’s Office and came to know that General Sundarji had been asked to conduct the operation. “When he (Sundarji) came out of there we rang him up and said that you may like to step into the MO directorate and discuss this issue with us. He said I am not interested in you people, I have got my orders and I am going to do it,” said General Sharma.
The former Army Chief further says that the decision to use 9 Infantry Division, headquartered in Meerut was that of General Sundarji himself and not the MO directorate. He added that Sundarji’s first choice was to approach GOC 15 Division (Maj Gen Jamwal) to do the task but he refused. “Sundarji asked him to produce a battalion of infantry and some support some tanks or something to take on this job, he refused. He said it was a political situation and not for Army to get intervened,” said General Sharma. He says General Sundarji thereafter chose 9 Division commanded by Major General KS Brar and that one of the reasons was that he wanted Sikhs conducting Operation Blue Star and taking part in actual action on ground.
During the course of the interview General Sharma also holds forth on the ethos of Indian Army training and obeying a lawful command. “The Indian Army officers training during command is to be an independent officer. If you find something wrong don’t do it. It is not a question of disobedience of orders. It is a question of obeying orders despite their better sense, because they are yes men and they want their promotion,” he said.
General VN Sharma’s remarks are bound to create a stir and the aspect of MO directorate opposing the use of Army has never been discussed in public.
Military theaterisation is an outdated concept that does not reflect the demands of contemporary warfare, former IAF Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat said on Monday. In an opinion piece for The Print, Ahlawat recalled the mandate behind India’s most significant recent defence reform. In February 2020, the Centre created the Department of Military Affairs and the office of the Chief of Defence Staff. One of the key tasks assigned to DMA/CDS, he said, was the creation of joint/theatre commands. “More than five years later, however, we have seen little progress on this front.”
The former pilot noted that initial debates over theatreisation were confined to ministries, service headquarters and a handful of experts. “Understandably, building consensus has proven difficult…But since Operation Sindoor, public interest in the functioning of the Indian Armed Forces has surged. This warrants a better understanding of the proposed theaterisation model, and the challenges that have stalled its implementation.”
At its core, he explained, theatreisation envisages reorganising the Army, Navy and Air Force into Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), each defined by geography and led by a single commander, with the goals of enhancing joint operations, optimising resources and streamlining command structures. Yet, Ahlawat warned, the model misunderstands both the problem and the solution.
“We are seeking a physical integration of forces that operate in fundamentally distinct domains — air, land, sea — with divergent operational needs and substantially different organisational cultures. The proposed ‘one size fits all’ model of theaterisation is built on an outdated conceptual framework that does not reflect the demands of contemporary warfare,” he said. “With its focus on geographic restructuring rather than functional alignment, the model is actually a solution in search of a problem.”
Modern conflicts, he argued, have moved beyond rigid regional deployments. The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrated how real-time intelligence, satellite-based communications, drones and long-range precision strikes can offset numerical inferiority, while Israel’s Gaza operations and India’s own Operation Sindoor underscore a turn toward non-contact, network-enabled warfare. As CDS Gen Anil Chauhan observed, Ahlawat pointed out, future wars are likely to unfold in cyberspace, space and standoff domains rather than along fixed frontiers.
“These data points suggest that the battlefield is being shaped by long-range fires, precision stand-off weapons, near real-time intelligence, space-based capabilities, unmanned systems, and strategic communications. The physical or geographic proximity of assets and commanders has very little role. Agility in decision-making is more important than integration of decision-making.”
The proposed ITCs appear more focused on optimising military bureaucracy by aligning commands geographically — for example, a Western Command for Pakistan, a Northern Command for China, and a Maritime Command for the Indian Ocean Region, the former IAF officer said. “While this may streamline administrative processes, it does not necessarily address the core requirement of modern warfare.”
To address the challenges of modern warfare, Ahlawat said, armed forces must prioritise functional integration over rigid geographic restructuring. He said the number of geographic commands should be reduced to three: “a Western Command for Pakistan, a Northern Command for China, and a Maritime Command for the Indian Ocean Region.”
According to him, the army’s resources should be divided into two geographic theatres: West (Pakistan) and North (China), reflecting operational requirements and terrain specialisation. The Navy, he added, should maintain one command (Maritime) and two fleets — Eastern and Western. The responsibility of island territories (Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep) must be taken over by Maritime command.
“The IAF should remain a single, unified entity covering the entire country due to its rapid deployment capabilities and nationwide operational flexibility,” he said. “However, it could be subdivided into two functional commands — Air Defence Command and Strike Command. Air Defence assets of other Services must be aligned with IAF’s AD command.”
Ahlawat suggested that the forces need to establish dedicated tri-Service functional commands for logistics, training, space, unmanned systems, cyberspace, strategic forces and design & development. “These functional commands would foster synergy, reduce costs, and ensure that domain-specific expertise is leveraged effectively.”
Indian Army 8th Pay Commission Salary Projections: Like many central government employees, the Indian Armys junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and commissioned officers have also been waiting for the 8th Pay Commission to be implemented. It is likely to give a substantial boost to their basic pay. But what can be estimated revised salaries for JCOs and officers like Captain, Major, Lt Colonel and Colonel at 1.92 and 2.28 fitment factors in the 8th CPC?
Indian Army 8th Pay Commission Salary Estimates: Central government employees have been waiting for the 8th Pay Commission recommendations to be implemented. Indian Army officers and junior commissioned officers (JCOs) are no exception, as their basic salaries and allowances are likely to see a substantial rise. JCOs such as Naib Subedar, Subedar, and Subedar Major and officers such as Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel will see their salary, pension, and other allowances revised once the pay commission is implemented.
The increase will most likely depend on the fitment factor that the pay commission decides.
But what can be their estimated revised basic salary if the 8th Pay Commission fitment factor is 1.92 or 2.28? See estimates –
Naib Subedar: Rs 35,400 –Rs 1,12,400
Subedar: Rs 44,900 – Rs 1,42,400
Subedar Major: Rs 47,600 – Rs 1,51,100
Lieutenant: Rs 56,100–Rs 1,77,500
Captain: Rs 61,300 – Rs 1,93,900
Major: Rs 69,400 – Rs 2,07,200
Lieutenant Colonel: Rs 1,21,200 – Rs 2,12,400
Colonel: Rs 1,30,600 – Rs 2,15,900
Brigadier: Rs 1,39,600 – Rs 2,17,600
Major General: Rs 1,44,200 – Rs 2,18,200
Lieutenant General: Rs 1,82,200 – Rs 2,24,100
General: Rs 2,50,000 (fixed)
Like many central government employees, Army personnel get basic allowances such as dearness allowance (DA), house rent allowance (HRA), and child education allowance (CEA).
However, based on their rank and the place of posting, they also get many other perks and allowances.
Some of the prominent of them are.
Military service pay (MSP): Rs 15,500 for officers up to the Brigadier rank.
High altitude allowance: For personnel posted in high-altitude regions, the allowance can be from Rs 1,600 to Rs 16,900.
Siachen allowance: Rs 42,500 per month
Field area allowance: It can be in the range of Rs 10,500-Rs 25,000 depending on their hardship level.
Special forces allowance: Rs 25,000 is given to the officers posted in special forces units.
Uniform allowance: The annual uniform allowance is Rs 20,000.
Kit maintenance allowance: Rs 400 per month
Counterinsurgency: Rs 6,300
Some other benefits that army personnel get are canteen facility (CSD), medical benefits, accommodation, pension and gratuity, and insurance cover.
We will calculate estimated minimum basic revised salaries for JCOs and Commissioned Officers at fitment factors of 1.92 and 2.28.
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 35,400
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 67,968
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 80,712
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 44,900
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 86,208
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 1,02,372
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 47,600
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 91,392
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 1,08,528
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 56,100
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 1,07,712
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 1,27,908
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 61,300
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 1,17,696
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 1,39,764
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 69,400
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 1,33,248
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 1,58,232
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 1,21,200
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 2,32,704
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 2,76,336
Current minimum basic pay- Rs 1,30,600
Estimated revised basic pay (at 1.92 fitment factor)- Rs 2,50,752
Estimated revised basic pay (at 2.28 fitment factor)- Rs 2,97,768
(Disclaimer: These are projections. Actual basic salary revisions may vary.)
Senior Citizen Card 2025 – बुजुर्गों के लिए खुशखबरी है। 60 साल की उम्र पार कर चुके लोगों के लिए सरकार ने एक खास कार्ड लॉन्च किया है – सीनियर सिटीजन कार्ड 2025। इस कार्ड की मदद से बुजुर्गों को कई सरकारी और निजी सुविधाएं आसानी से मिल सकती हैं। अब न तो लंबी लाइनें लगानी होंगी और न ही बार-बार कागजों की जांच में परेशान होना पड़ेगा। सीनियर सिटीजन कार्ड एक पहचान के साथ-साथ सम्मान का प्रतीक भी बन चुका है।
अब सवाल उठता है कि ये कार्ड है क्या और इससे फायदा कैसे मिलेगा? तो चलिए आपको आसान भाषा में सबकुछ बताते हैं।
सीनियर सिटीजन कार्ड 2025 एक ऐसा पहचान पत्र है जिसे केंद्र या राज्य सरकार 60 साल या उससे ज्यादा उम्र वाले भारतीय नागरिकों को जारी करती है। इसके जरिए बुजुर्गों को सरकारी योजनाओं, स्वास्थ्य सेवाओं, यात्रा में छूट, बैंकिंग में प्राथमिकता, और सामाजिक सुरक्षा जैसी कई सुविधाएं मिलती हैं।
60 दिन के बाद में इतने का हो जाएगा 10 ग्राम सोना Gold Rate
ये कार्ड किसी भी राज्य के समाज कल्याण विभाग, नगर निगम या तहसील कार्यालय से बनवाया जा सकता है। इसकी वैधता कुछ जगहों पर आजीवन होती है, तो कुछ राज्यों में इसे समय-समय पर रिन्यू भी करवाना पड़ता है।
अब बात करते हैं असली मुद्दे की – फायदे क्या हैं? सीनियर सिटीजन कार्ड के साथ जो सुविधाएं मिलती हैं, वो बुजुर्गों के लिए वाकई बड़ी राहत लेकर आती हैं:
अब FASTag का टाइम खत्म! 10 जून से बदलेगा पूरा सिस्टम – GNSS से सीधे कटेगा टोल GNSS Toll System
1. हेल्थ सर्विसेज में राहत
सरकारी अस्पतालों में मुफ्त इलाज, जल्दी डॉक्टर से मिलना, दवाओं में छूट और हेल्थ चेकअप कैंप्स की सुविधा।
2. यात्रा में छूट
रेलवे में पुरुषों को 40% और महिलाओं को 50% तक की छूट। कुछ राज्यों में रोडवेज बसों और मेट्रो में फ्री यात्रा की सुविधा भी मिलती है।
3. बैंकिंग में प्राथमिकता
बैंक में अलग काउंटर, सेविंग्स या FD पर ज्यादा ब्याज और बिना लंबा इंतजार किए काम हो जाता है।
4. टैक्स में राहत
3 लाख तक की आय टैक्स फ्री होती है और सेक्शन 80TTB में भी छूट मिलती है।
5. पेंशन योजनाएं
इंदिरा गांधी वृद्धावस्था पेंशन, अटल वयो अभ्युदय योजना जैसी कई योजनाओं का लाभ इस कार्ड के जरिए सीधा मिलता है।
6. कानूनी मदद और हेल्पलाइन
मुफ्त कानूनी सलाह, हेल्पलाइन नंबर (जैसे Elder Line 14567) से तुरंत मदद मिलती है।
पत्नी के साथ लीजिए होम लोन और बचाइए सीधे लाखों रुपये – जानिए कैसे Joint Home Loan Benefits
7. सामाजिक भागीदारी और मनोरंजन
पार्क, म्यूजियम, लाइब्रेरी आदि में एंट्री छूट और सामुदायिक कार्यक्रमों में भाग लेने का मौका।
8. अन्य राज्यवार फायदे
ऑनलाइन तरीका:
लोन लेना हुआ मुश्किल! नया नियम लागू – बिना इस स्कोर के नहीं मिलेगा लोन CIBIL Score Rule
ऑफलाइन तरीका:
2025 तक भारत में सीनियर सिटीजन की संख्या 15% से ज्यादा हो चुकी है। ऐसे में यह जरूरी हो गया है कि बुजुर्गों को सम्मान और सुविधा दोनों मिलें। सीनियर सिटीजन कार्ड न केवल उन्हें योजनाओं का लाभ दिलाने में मदद करता है, बल्कि उन्हें समाज में एक पहचान और आत्मनिर्भरता भी देता है।
Recommends additional 10% reservation for Agniveers in govt jobs
ishant Kumar Yadav, Deputy Commissioner-cum-president, Zila Sainik Board. File photo
The Zila Sainik Board (ZSB) has sought an increase in ex-gratia relief and additional 10% reservation for Agniveers in government jobs.
A meeting of the ZSB was today held under the chairmanship of Nishant Kumar Yadav, Deputy Commissioner-cum-president of the board. The meeting was attended by Brig BS Dhillon (retd), vice-president of the board, Lt Col Sanjeev Sharma, a representative of Station HQ Chandigarh, Lt Col RK Singh (retd), KK Sharda, a social worker, and Col HS Ghuman (retd), Zila Sainik Welfare Officer.
The board deliberated on key issues pertaining to the welfare of ex-servicemen and their families. After thorough discussions, the board forwarded various proposals to the UT Administration for consideration and necessary approval. It proposed to increase the rate of ex-gratia compensation from the existing Rs 50 lakh to Rs 1 crore for the families of armed forces and paramilitary forces martyrs.
A recommendation was made for an additional 10% reservation for Agniveer candidates in all direct recruitment for Group ‘B’ and Group ‘C’ posts under the Chandigarh Administration, recognising their service and commitment to national security.
The Deputy Commissioner emphasised the urgent need to renovate the Sainik Rest House and instructed the officials of the noard to coordinate with the UT Chief Engineer to expedite the process of floating a tender for it.
In the June 7 violence in Imphal, the Arambai Tenggol (AT) and its sympathisers were mobilised to wreak violence against the Indian State
At times, an act of bravado can simultaneously reveal one’s prowess and vulnerability. The June 7 violent protest in the Imphal valley was one such act. Though a bit different, it can be seen as a sequel to act one of the bravado displayed on January 24, 2024. That time, 38 Meitei legislators, under the aegis of the Arambai Tenggol (AT), had blamed the Kukis for fomenting violence and taken a six-point public oath to aggressively push the partisan and majoritarian agenda of the AT and the powers that be to protect Meitei identity and lebensraum (territory/land).
An election without the Awami League will end up repeating Sheikh Hasina’s mistakes
MUHAMMAD Yunus, the head of Bangladesh’s interim government, has announced that the country will hold elections in the first half of April 2026. By making this announcement, the Nobel laureate and Grameen Bank founder has sought to silence critics and opponents who questioned how interim his administration really was and if he would ever let go of power.
The questions arose because the interim administration, set up in the days after the ouster of the Sheikh Hasina government, has not only been inept at restoring a measure of order in the country even after 10 months but has also appeared to be taking important policy decisions impacting the country’s foreign policy and security.
The Bangladesh Army, too, questioned the decisions, publicly airing discontent at not being consulted on the move to establish a “humanitarian corridor” from Bangladesh to the Rakhine state in Myanmar, apparently at the prodding of the United Nations. The army had also pressed for an “early and inclusive” election. Yunus tried an age-old gambit adopted by leaders who believe in their own indispensability. He threatened to resign, and, predictably, was persuaded to stay on.
The announcement of elections in April has hardly cleared the air of political uncertainty or suspicions about his intentions. For one, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), the second largest political party in the country after the Awami League, has rejected the timeline, and reiterated its demand for elections before the end of this year. In this, it is on the same side as the army. In a volatile political atmosphere still charged with anger against the Hasina government, the BNP, harassed and suppressed for over a decade, is eyeing a big electoral comeback.
Yunus’ justification for his reluctance to hold polls earlier than next year is that when he took office, he promised to do three things: carry out constitutional, electoral and other institutional reforms through a process of national consensus; provide justice for those who were killed in police firing during the student protests that eventually led to Hasina’s exit; and conduct elections.
The argument is that making the much-needed corrections to a broken political, governance and judicial structure would ensure that the elections did not reproduce the kind of one-party rule and authoritarian slide witnessed during Hasina’s three terms. The view in sections of Bangladesh is that had these reforms been carried out before the 2008 elections, the country would have been spared the political chaos and bloodshed.
Yunus set up six commissions to study each aspect and suggest changes. These commissions have duly submitted their reports. Now, a “national consensus commission” of political parties’ representatives is trying to forge an all-round agreement on the reforms. It is no surprise that the consensus is proving to be elusive.
The BNP, whose political instincts remain sharp despite a decade in the wilderness and its leader Khaleda Zia’s long years in jail or home imprisonment, has said the holding of elections cannot be held ransom to the lack of consensus on the reforms. Aside from the BNP’s own electoral calculations, the concern is that putting off the elections may worsen the chaotic conditions in the country, eventually making the holding of elections impossible.
More pertinently, however, all the talk of reforms and consensus sounds hollow given that the Awami League has been banned, and thus cannot take part in the election. With Hasina and many leaders in her clique living in exile in Delhi, its cadres and supporters being targeted at home, and no effective second rung to speak of, the Awami League is in total disarray.
Yunus may carry out all the reforms he wants, and may even take his time doing that. But any claim of corrections to Bangladesh’s many problems will remain hollow, and their purpose defeated if the Awami League, hollowed out though it is, cannot take part in the elections. Banning the party and keeping it out of the elections can only widen the political and social faultlines. It is a sure path to the repetition of the many blunders committed by Hasina.
Even the reforms themselves, ostensibly to be arrived at by a process of national consensus, would lack that very consensus as the Awami League is not a part of that process. Instead, what is apparent now is an attempt to airbrush the party of Bangladesh’s liberation out of the nation’s past, present and future.
On the other hand is the resurrection of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in the atrocities committed in the months before the country’s liberation. The Jamaat was stripped of its registration as a political party and disallowed from participating in the 2013 elections after the Bangladesh Supreme Court under Hasina’s watch ruled that the party’s constitution went against the secular principles of the national constitution. Last month, Jamaat leader ATM Azharul Islam, who was tried and convicted as a collaborationist by the “International Criminal Court” set up by the Hasina government, was acquitted.
While the trials of the Jamaat members were decried at the time as partisan and dubious, and the judicial proceedings as a kangaroo court, the irony is hard to miss: an administration that says it wants to set Bangladesh on the right path is using the same court to try Hasina on charges of corruption and “crimes against humanity” . Her trial, whose outcome is pre-determined, will take place in absentia. India is unlikely to accede to Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition. The issue will worsen relations between the two countries. The Awami League’s only hope now is that the Bangladesh Army will press for and secure its inclusion.
Meanwhile, the Jamaat, a former ally of the BNP, is now confident it can make greater electoral inroads than before, on its own. It is also keen on elections but wants time. Yunus’ April timeline is close to the Jamaat’s own demand that elections should be held in mid-2026, the time that it needs to strengthen its network on the ground. This is also why the party is pushing for local elections first.
As such, the transition to an elected government, whether it happens in April or earlier, is not going to bring political stability in Bangladesh. Sreeradha Datta, who teaches international relations at Jindal Global University, and follows developments in Bangladesh closely, told Frontline in an interview that stability will be elusive until the political culture of that country changes.
The silver lining is that there are people in Bangladesh who remember the liberation story only too well. The home of Awami League founder and father of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman can be vandalised and burnt, and his face erased from currency notes. But it is more difficult to erase the memories of killings and rapes following Bangladesh’s March 1971 declaration of independence. This is why the apology proffered by Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman for “past actions” of “party members” is inadequate. This is also why Pakistan’s aim to “normalise” relations with Bangladesh will remain a pipe dream.
Nirupama Subramanian is an independent journalist.
Lieutenant General Rajiv Ghai, who Pakistan contacted for a ceasefire during India’s strikes on Pakistani airbases in Operation Sindoor, has been appointed as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy).
लेफ्टिनेंट जनरल राजीव घई को भारतीय सेना के डिप्टी चीफ ऑफ आर्मी स्टाफ (स्ट्रैटेजी) पद पर प्रमोट किया गया है। ऑपरेशन सिंदूर में अहम भूमिका निभाने वाले जनरल घई को हाल ही में उत्तम युद्ध सेवा पदक से सम्मानित भी किया गया है। अब वह DGMO की जिम्मे
Lt. Gen Ghai will continue to serve in his current role as Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), the Ministry of Defence announced on Monday, June 9.
The DGMOs are senior officials of Indian Army, usually of the rank of Lieutenant General, responsible for overseeing all military operations in India and along its borders.
Meanwhile, Lt. General Ghai’s new role — Deputy Chief (Strategy) — is a relatively new but a critical position within the Indian Army, created to oversee key branches such as the Operations and Intelligence Directorates. It is regarded as one of the most significant appointments in the Army’s strategic command structure, reported PTI.
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Lieutenant General Rajiv Ghai took charge as the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) on October 25 last year. A senior officer from the Kumaon Regiment, Lt. Gen Ghai has held several key operational commands throughout his career.
Before his current role, Lt Gen Ghai served as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Chinar Corps, where he led critical counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir. His leadership in high-pressure environments has earned him wide recognition.
On June 4, Lt Gen Ghai was also awarded the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal (UYSM) during the Defence Investiture Ceremony 2025 (Phase-II), recognising his distinguished service.
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Lt Gen Ghai had then, during his Manipur visit, stressed the importance of a “whole-of-government approach” to manage security challenges in the region. Discussions focused on normalising the prevailing situation, enhancing border management, and strengthening security infrastructure along the IMB, according to a prior statement from the Ministry of Defence.
Former Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane has called for urgent policy and legislative action to counter emerging drone threats to critical infrastructure in India, following Ukraine’s long-range drone strike on multiple Russian airbases in a covert operation codenamed Operation Spider’s Web.
In an opinion piece in The Print, General Naravane wrote: “What these drone attacks have magnified is that there is no classical front line and that the entire country is the battlefield.” He urged the government to declare ‘no-fly zones’ near vulnerable areas and enforce them through severe penalties under the National Security Act, rather than treat drone violations as minor civil infractions.
